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1.1 Game theory and connection situations
In this monograph Game Theory is central for studying the interaction among
decision makers (which are called players) in connection situations, where play-
ers need to be connected directly or via other players to a source, and where
connections between players and between players and the source are costly.
Since the seminal book \Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by John
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), it is usual to divide Game The-
ory into two main groups of interaction situations (which are called games),
non-cooperative and cooperative games. Non-cooperative games deal with con-
°ict situations where players cannot make binding agreements. In cooperative
games all kinds of agreement among the players are possible.
In non-cooperative games, each player will choose to act in his own interest
keeping into account that the outcome of the game depends on the actions of all
the players involved. Actions can be made simultaneously by players, as in the
`stone, paper, scissors' game or in `matching pennies', or sequentially at several
time moments, as in chess.
Cooperative games deal with situations where groups of players (which are
called coalitions) coordinate their actions with the objective to end up in joint
payo®s which often exceed the sum of individual payo®s. A classical application
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of cooperative games is in cost allocation problems (see, for instance, Young
(1994)). Using cooperative games in this context, it is possible to describe a
situation where the players are willing to join bigger coalitions in order to have
extra monetary savings as e®ect of cooperation. A very simple example is a
situation with two nearby towns that are considering whether to implement a
joint waste collection system. Town 1 could implement a system for itself at
a cost of 7 million euros, whereas town 2 could implement its waste collection
system at a cost of 4 million euros. However, if they cooperate, thanks to a more
e±cient use of common facilities, they can implement a waste collection system
at a cost of 10 million euros. This situation can be formulated as a cooperative
cost game (or simply cost game) (f1;2g;c), where towns 1 and 2 are the players
and the characteristic cost function c assigns to each coalition the corresponding
cost of implementing a waste collection system, i.e. (in million euros) c(f1g) = 7,
c(f2g) = 4, c(f1;2g) = 10 and c(;) = 0. Clearly, it makes sense to cooperate,
since the two players can jointly save 1 million. Cooperation will only occur,
however, if they agree on how to share the total cost of 10 million euros. Trying
to solve this problem, a cost allocation that can be accepted by both towns
1 and 2 must be e±cient (the total cost must be entirely shared), equitable
and must provide incentives to cooperation. For instance, one could propose to
share equally the cost of 10 million euros, 5 million euros for each town. The
argument for equal division is that each town has an equal power to enter in a
contract, so each town should support an equal burden. On the other hand, it
could be the case that town 1 produces four times the waste of town 2. Then,
it seems fair to propose a method based on the proportion of waste produced
by the two towns. Such an allocation method would charge town 1 of 8 million
euros and town 2 of 2 million euros. Surely, neither of these two proposals will
be adopted. In fact, town 2 is not likely to agree to equal division, because 5
million euros exceed the cost of implementing its own collection system. On the
other hand, town 1 is not likely to agree to the allocation method proportional
to waste production, since 8 million exceed the cost of implementing its own
system. One possible solution for cost game (f1;2g;c) is to equally divide the
amount of money that 1 and 2 save by cooperation. Using this method, town
1 would pay 7 ¡ 0:5 = 6:5 million, and town 2 would pay 4 ¡ 0:5 = 3:5 million.1.1. GAME THEORY AND CONNECTION SITUATIONS 3
This allocation gives to players an incentive to cooperate, because each realizes
positive savings. But, it is not the only allocation with these characteristics.
Any allocation in which 1 pays at most 7 million and 2 pays at most 4 million
creates no disincentives to cooperation: using game theory terminology, such
an allocation is stable. The set of all stable allocations is the core of the cost
game, a concept that will be more generally de¯ned in Chapter 2.
Clearly, the example above is just one of the many situations in which game
theory can be used to analyze a cost allocation problem. In particular, this
dissertation is focused on the application of cooperative games to the analysis
of cost allocation problems arising from connection situations. A connection
situation takes place in the presence of a group of agents, each of which needs
to be connected directly or via other agents to a source. If connections among
agents are costly, then each agent will evaluate the opportunity of cooperating
with other agents in order to reduce costs. In fact, if a group of agents decides to
cooperate, a con¯guration of links which minimizes the total cost of connection is
provided by a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst). A connection situation may
arise facing the problem of building a network of computers that connects every
computer with some server: agents are the computer users, the source is the
server and the costs of links are the connection costs of each pair of computers or
of a computer and the server. Another example could be the problem of building
a drainage system that connects every house in a city with a water puri¯er. The
problem of ¯nding an mcst may be easily solved thanks to di®erent algorithms
proposed in literature (Boruvka (1926a,b), whose translations may be found in
Ne· set· ril et al (2001), Kruskal (1956), Prim (1957), Dijkstra (1959). A historic
overview of mcst problems can be found in Graham and Hell (1985).
However, ¯nding an mcst does not guarantee that it is going to be really
implemented: agents must still support the cost of the mcst and then a cost
allocation problem must be addressed. This cost allocation problem was in-
troduced by Claus and Kleitman in 1973 and has been studied with the aid of
cooperative game theory since the basic paper of Bird (1976). Given a con-
nection situation with a group of agents, Bird (1976) introduced an associated
cooperative cost game (known as mcst game), where the players are the agents
and the worth of a coalition is the minimal cost of connecting this coalition to4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
the source via links between members of the coalition; in addition, Bird (1976)
proposed an allocation method for connection situations (in this dissertation re-
ferred as the Bird rule) that associates with each mcst a cost allocation. After
the paper of Bird, much attention has been paid to study the properties of core
allocations for mcst games. Granot and Huberman (1981) proved that alloca-
tions provided by the Bird rule for connection situations are extreme points of
the core of the associated mcst game. Granot and Huberman (1984) also pro-
posed other methods which provide allocations in the core of an mcst game, with
particular attention to ease computational di±culty in computing the nucleolus
of an mcst game. In a similar direction, Feltkamp et al. (1994a,b) introduced
and characterized the Proportional rule and the Equal Remaining Obligation
rule for connection situations. Aarts (1994) found other extreme points of the
core when the connection situation has an mcst which is a chain, i.e. a tree
with only two leaves (a leaf of a tree is a node with only one incident edge).
Kuipers (1993) introduced core elements of mcst games associated to connection
situations where the cost of each link is either zero or one. The Shapley value
(Shapley (1953)) of an mcst game, which is not necessarily in the core of an
mcst game, was also studied and axiomatically characterized by Kar (2002).
Many cost allocation methods have been proposed, and di®erent properties
have been considered as well to make them suitable for application in a \dy-
namic" framework. In many applications the cardinality of the set of agents can
vary in time, and also increasing or decreasing of connection costs may occur.
Consider, for instance, a wireless telecommunication network where agents are
operators of transmitters for tra±c exchange and the source is the central hub
station. Agents can decide to communicate directly with the main exchange
hub, by means of powerful and very expensive transmitters, or, alternatively,
can decide to cooperate and construct a wireless network of less powerful, and
consequently, cheaper transmitters. Since transmissions are costly, such a situa-
tion can be handled as an mcst problem and the related cost allocation problem
can be studied as an mcst game. Moreover, in such a situation, it may happen
that at a given moment either new owners of transmitters can be willing to enter
the network, or the cost of connection can increase (e.g. as a consequence of an
improvement in quality and quantity of services supplied) or decrease (e.g. by1.1. GAME THEORY AND CONNECTION SITUATIONS 5
improving telecommunication technologies). Of course, in all the connection
situations that may change in time, cost allocations which are stable only in the
original situation cannot guarantee cooperation among agents also under the
new conditions.
Another realistic example where changes in the original connection situation
may occur is in supply networks. Connection situations may be useful to answer
questions regarding the implementation of clauses in supply contracts concern-
ing transportation networks and the related cost allocation problem (Vo¼ and
Schneidereit (2002), Sharkey (1995)). In this case, agents are customer nodes
of a supply chain, who all want to be connected with a central service (i.e. the
source), directly or via other agents, and where connections are costly (e.g. costs
due to transportation or to lead times). Stability is an important characteristic
for cost allocation protocols applied to supply transportation networks, since it
is a necessary condition for any subset of customers not to secede and build their
own competing transportation sub-network. But, increasing of transportation
costs may occur, and, consequently, other incentives to cooperation are de-
manded. For instance, supply contracts must take into consideration clauses for
having various transport possibilities enabling, e.g., expedited delivery in cases
of necessary adjustments in the lead times (Vo¼ and Schneidereit (2002)) with
corresponding increasing of transportation costs.
It should be evident that all those cost allocation problems arising from
connection situations which may undergo one or more changes, require sustain-
able allocation methods. Therefore, the goal of this monograph is to analyze
allocation methods which can keep, in the most general setting, incentives for
cooperation also under modi¯cations in the population of agents and in the
structure of connection costs. For example, the question of the existence of
population monotonic allocation schemes (pmas) (Sprumont (1990)) is central.
A pmas provides a cost allocation vector for every coalition in a monotonic way,
i.e. the cost allocated to some player does not increase if the coalition to which
he belongs becomes larger. Another example regards cost monotonic alloca-
tion rules, that will also be studied in this monograph, where cost monotonicity
means that if some connection costs go down (up), then no agents will pay more
(less). To achieve this goal, the Kruskal algorithm (Kruskal (1956)) plays a key6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
role. Roughly speaking, this algorithm works in the following way: in the ¯rst
step an edge between two nodes in N [f0g of minimal cost is formed. In every
subsequent step, a new edge of minimal cost is formed, under the constraint that
no cycles are formed. In summary, a sequence of edges is produced and after
n steps an mcst appears. Since some edges may have the same cost, di®erent
mcsts may be selected by the Kruskal algorithm, depending on the ordering of
the edges with respect to their increasing costs which has been considered in
the Kruskal algorithm.
In this monograph, a set of cost allocation protocols is provided which charge
the agents with \fractions" of the cost of each edge constructed in each step of
the Kruskal algorithm with the possibility to control the cost allocation problem
during the construction procedure (Moretti et al. (2005), Norde et al. (2004)).
These protocols can be easily implemented in practical network situations (for
instance, in supply transportation networks), are °exible to changes in the net-
work situation, and meet the requirement of continuous monitoring by the agents
involved. It turns out that a subclass of these cost allocation protocols coin-
cides with the class of Obligations rules (Tijs et al. (2006a)). It is shown that
Obligation rules are cost monotonic and induce a pmas. Interesting rules among
Obligation rules are the P-value (Branzei et al. (2004), Feltkamp et al. (1994b))
and the P¿-values, for each ordering ¿ of the players (Norde et al. (2004)). Other
characteristics of the Obligation rules are that di®erent feasible orderings of the
edges lead to the same cost allocations and that all these allocations are ele-
ments of the Bird core (Bird (1976), Tijs et al. (2006b)). Variants of connection
situations are also studied (Norde et al. (2004), Moretti et al. (2002)).
Other authors have studied cost allocation problems under modi¯cations of
the elements of the connection situations. In the paper of Kent and Skorin-
Kapov (1996) the question of the existence of pmas in connection situations is
central. In the paper of Dutta and Kar (2004), cost monotonic allocation rules
were studied, where cost monotonicity means that an agent i does not pay more
if the cost of a link involving i decreases, nothing else changing in the network.
Monotonicity properties for cost allocation protocols have been also studied in
Berga~ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2007a). Berga~ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2007b) in-
troduced the class of optimistic transferable utility games associated to mcst1.1. GAME THEORY AND CONNECTION SITUATIONS 7
situations, where the worth of a coalition is the minimal cost of connecting
this coalition to the source or to a player who is not a member of the coali-
tion. Berga~ ntinos and Lorenzo-Freire (2008b) introduced optimistic weighted
Shapley rules for connection situations and proved that they are special Oblig-
ation rules. Later, Berga~ ntinos and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a) characterized the
optimistic weighted Shapley rules using monotonicity properties.
Other classes of cost allocation problems related to variants in connection sit-
uations are: Steiner tree games (Megiddo (1978), Skorin-Kapov (1995)), where
the cost of a coalition of agents is the minimum weight of a Steiner tree1 that
spans the coalition; minimum cost spanning forest games (Kuipers (1998)), deal-
ing with more than one source; spanning network games (Granot and Maschler
(1999), van den Nouweland et al. (1993)), where costs are both on the edges and
on the vertices of the connection situation; hub network games (Skorin-Kapov
(1998)), where some of the nodes of the connection situation serve as focal points
(i.e. hubs); mcst extension problems (Feltkamp (1994)), which are generalized
connection situations in which some network can be present initially.
More recently, Fernandez et al. (2004) have introduced a multi-criteria ver-
sion of an mcst-game as a set-valued TU-game, and provided a family of core
solutions for these games. Suijs (2003) studied mcst problems in which the
connection costs are represented by random variables. Granot et al. (2002) in-
troduced the class of extended tree games, where the agents want to receive a
commodity °ow from the root and the °ow requirements of the agents can be
di®erent. Moretti (2006) introduced a class of mcst games applied to the analy-
sis of gene expression data, where nodes in the connection situation represent
genes and the cost of a link between two genes is a measure of dissimilarity
between the two genes.
1Given a subset of nodes identi¯ed as terminals in a connection situation, a Steiner tree is
an mcst that includes all the terminals and possibly many others. Note that for Steiner tree
problems some nodes may be switching points (i.e. there are no users residing at them).8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.2 Overview
This dissertation mainly deals with cost games arising from mcst situations
which are de¯ned on undirected complete weighted graphs, where coalitions are
not allowed to use networks which contain nodes outside the coalitions. Only
Chapter 7 is devoted to variants of this kind of mcst situations.
In Chapter 2, some basic preliminaries and notations are presented. The
notions of mcst situations and mcst games are formulated and illustrated on
basic complete weighted graphs, that have been used throughout the monograph
to illustrate also other concepts. The de¯nitions of some basic notions in the
theory of cooperative games, as the core of a game or the notion of pmas, are
also introduced and illustrated with examples.
In Chapter 3, the Subtraction Algorithm is presented. This algorithm com-
putes, for every mcst situation and each permutation on the set of players, a
pmas. As a basis for this algorithm serves a decomposition theorem which guar-
antees that every mcst game can be written as a nonnegative combination of
mcst games corresponding to 0 ¡ 1 cost functions (called simple mcst games).
It turns out that the Subtraction Algorithm is closely related to the famous
algorithm of Kruskal for the determination of mcsts. Furthermore, for each per-
mutation ¿ on the set of players, the notion of P¿-value is introduced, as the
allocation rule for mcst situations which divides the cost of the grand coalition
according to the Subtraction Algorithm initialized with ¿. This chapter is based
on Norde, Moretti, Tijs (2004).
In Chapter 4, the class of Construct and Charge (CC-) rules for mcst sit-
uations is introduced. CC-rules are de¯ned starting from charge systems, and
specify particular allocation protocols rooted on the Kruskal algorithm for com-
puting an mcst. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the class of Obligation rules
for mcst situations. A characteristic of Obligation rules is that they assign to an
mcst situation a vector of cost contributions which can be obtained as a product
of a double stochastic matrix with the cost vector of edges in the optimal tree
provided by the Kruskal algorithm. It is proved that special charge systems,
called conservative, lead to a subclass of CC-rules that coincides with the class
of Obligation rules. An interesting feature of such rules is that di®erent feasible
orderings of the edges lead to the same cost allocations. Properties of particular1.2. OVERVIEW 9
Obligation rules, as the Potters value (P-value) and the P¿-value introduced in
Chapter 3, are also discussed. It turns out that the P-value equals the Equal
Remaining Obligations (ERO) rule suggested by Jos Potters (which explains
the name of the value) and which is studied ¯rst in Feltkamp et al. (1994). Fur-
thermore, the P-value turns out to be the average of the P¿-values. Sections
4.2-4.4 and 4.7 are based on Moretti, Tijs, Branzei, Norde (2008); section 4.5 is
based on Tijs, Branzei, Moretti, Norde (2006a); section 4.6 is based on Branzei,
Moretti, Norde, Tijs (2004).
In Chapter 5, it is ¯rst demonstrated that Obligation rules are cost monotonic
and induce also a pmas. Then, a new way to de¯ne the irreducible core (Bird
(1976)) is presented, based on a non-Archimedean semimetric. The Bird core
correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity prop-
erties, and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst situations is a
selection of the Bird core correspondence. Section 5.2 is based on Tijs, Branzei,
Moretti, Norde (2006a); sections 5.3 and 5.4 are based on Tijs, Moretti, Branzei,
Norde (2006b).
In Chapter 6 an axiomatic characterization of the P-value is provided, where
cone-wise positive linearity of the P-value is a fundamental property and where
the decomposition of an mcst situation into simple mcst situations plays a role.
Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core
correspondence is also given. A value-theoretic interpretation of the Obligation
rules using sharing values for cost games is also discussed. Section 6.2 is based
on Branzei, Moretti, Norde, Tijs (2004); section 6.3 is based on Tijs, Moretti,
Branzei, Norde (2006b); section 6.4 is based on Moretti, Tijs, Branzei, Norde
(2005).
In Chapter 7 it is shown that, for variants of classical mcst games, a pmas
does not necessarily exist. In particular, this chapter deals with monotonic mcst
situations and directed mcst situations. Directed mcst situations of a special
kind are studied, namely those which show up in considering the problem of
connecting units (houses) in mountains with a puri¯er. For such problems
an easy method is described to obtain an mcst. It turns out that the cores
of the related cost allocation problems have a simple structure and each core
element can be extended to a pmas and also to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
(Branzei et al. (2001), Voorneveld et al. (2002)). Sections 7.2 and 7.3 are based
on Norde, Moretti, Tijs (2004); section 7.4 is based on Moretti, Norde, Pham
Do, Tijs (2002).Chapter 2
Connection situations and
games
2.1 Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situa-
tions
An (undirected) graph is a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices or nodes
and E is a set of edges e of the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j. The complete
graph on a set V of vertices is the graph < V;EV >, where EV = ffi;jgji;j 2
V and i 6= jg.
A path between i and j in a graph < V;E > is a sequence of nodes (i0;i1;:::;
ik), where i = i0 and j = ik, k ¸ 1, such that fis;is+1g 2 E for each s 2
f0;:::;k¡1g and such that all these edges are distinct. A cycle in < V;E > is a
path from i to i for some i 2 V . A path (i0;i1;:::;ik) is without cycles if there
do not exist a;b 2 f0;1;:::;kg, a 6= b, such that ia = ib. Two nodes i;j 2 V
are connected in < V;E > if i = j or if there exists a path between i and j in
E. A connected component of V in < V;E > is a maximal subset of V with the
property that any two nodes in this subset are connected in < V;E >.
This monograph deals with minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations,
i.e. situations where a set N = f1;:::;ng of agents is willing to be connected as
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cheap as possible to a source (i.e. a supplier of a service) denoted by 0, based
on a given weight (or cost) system of connection. In the sequel we use also the
notation N0 = N [f0g, and w for the weight function, i.e. a map which assigns
to each edge e 2 EN0 a non-negative number w(e) representing the weight or
cost of edge e.
We denote an mcst situation with set of users N, source 0, and weight
function w by < N0;w > (or simply w). Further, we denote by WN
0
the set
of all mcst situations < N0;w > (or w) with node set N0. For each S µ N,
one can consider the mcst subsituation < S0;wjS0 >, where S0 = S [ f0g and
wjS0 : ES0 ! I R+ is the restriction of the weight function w to ES0 µ EN0,
i.e. wjS0(e) = w(e) for each e 2 ES0. If w(e) 2 f0;1g for every e 2 EN0,
the weight function w is called a simple weight function, and we refer then to
< N0;EN0;w > as a simple mcst situation.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The carrier Ca(w) of w is the set of
edges with positive costs, i.e. Ca(w) = fe 2 E : w(e) > 0g. Two nodes i and j
are called (w;N0)-connected if i = j or if there exists a path (i0;:::;ik) from i
to j, with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k¡1g. A (w;N0)-component of
N0 is a maximal subset of N0 with the property that any two nodes in this subset
are (w;N0)-connected. We denote by Ci(w) the (w;N0)-component to which i
belongs and by C(w) the set of all the (w;N0)-components of N0. Clearly, the
collection of (w;N0)-components forms a partition of N0.
The cost of a network ¡ µ EN0 is w(¡) =
P
e2¡ w(e). A network ¡ is a
spanning network on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 ¡ we have e 2 ES0 and for every
i 2 S there is a path in < S0;¡ > from i to the source. For any mcst situation
w 2 WN
0
it is possible to determine at least one spanning tree on N0, i.e. a
spanning network without cycles on N0, of minimum cost; each spanning tree of
minimum cost is called an mcst for N0 in w or, shorter, an mcst for w. Given a
spanning network ¡ on N0 we de¯ne the set of edges of ¡ with nodes in S0 µ N0
as the set E¡
S0 = ffi;jgjfi;jg 2 ¡ and i;j 2 S0g.
Example 2.1.1 In this example we consider a minimum cost spanning tree
situation arising from the problem of car pooling. Suppose that three employees
of a ¯rm consider the possibility of car pooling in order to reduce their daily
travel cost. The cost of driving a car from one employee to another or from one2.1. MINIMUM COST SPANNING TREE (MCST) SITUATIONS 13















































Figure 2.1: An mcst situation < f0;1;2;3g;w > (left side) and a related mcst
(right side).
by 1, 2, and 3 and the ¯rm by 0. To each edge e 2 Ef0;1;2;3g is assigned a
non-negative number w(e) representing the cost of edge e. A minimum cost
spanning tree in this mcst situation < f0;1;2;3g;w > is the network ¡ =
ff0;1g;f1;2g;f1;3gg with cost w(¡) = 48. This network ¡ corresponds to the
plan of car pooling in which employees 2 and 3 drive their car in solitude to
employee 1 where all employees take one car in order to drive together to the
¯rm. In the remaining of the thesis, to capture the attention of the reader on a
certain mcst, we will represent the edges of the mcst by means of thicker lines,
as it has been shown in Figure 2.2.
2.1.1 Algorithms for the determination of an mcst
Two famous algorithms for the determination of a minimum cost spanning tree
are the algorithm of Prim (Prim (1957)) and the algorithm of Kruskal (Kruskal
(1956)). Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. A minimum cost spanning tree































Figure 2.2: An mcst situation < f0;1;2;3g;w > and an mcst in <
f0;1;2;3g;w > with edges denoted by thicker lines.
Prim's Algorithm: In the ¯rst step construct an edge of minimal
cost between a node in N and the source 0. In every subsequent
step construct an edge of minimal cost between a node in N which
is not connected yet with the source, directly or indirectly, and the
source or with a node in N which is already connected with the
source, directly or indirectly. In every step of the algorithm there is
precisely one node in S which gets a connection with the source, so
the algorithm stops after precisely jNj steps.
Kruskal's Algorithm: In the ¯rst step construct an edge between
nodes in N[f0g of minimal cost. In every subsequent step construct
an edge between nodes in N [ f0g of minimal cost which does not
form a cycle with the edges which have already been constructed.
The algorithm also stops after precisely jNj steps.
Example 2.1.2 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > of Example 2.1.1, with
N0 = f0;1;2;3g and w as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Prim's Algorithm may ¯rst form edge f0;1g, then f1;2g (alternatively, f1;3g),
and ¯nally f1;3g (alternatively, f1;2g). Having selected the edge f0;1g in the
¯rst step, Prim's algorithm on this mcst situation determines the mcst ff0;1g;
f1;2g;f1;3gg. On the same mcst situation, Prim's Algorithm may ¯rst form
edge f0;2g, then f1;2g, and ¯nally f1;3g, bringing to the mcst ff0;2g;f1;2g;
f1;3gg.2.1. MINIMUM COST SPANNING TREE (MCST) SITUATIONS 15
Kruskal's Algorithm ¯rst forms the cheapest edge f1;2g (alternatively, f1;3g),
then f1;3g (alternatively, f1;2g). After the ¯rst two steps of the Kruskal's Al-
gorithm, the cheapest edges f1;2g and f1;3g have been formed. Since edge
f2;3g forms a cycle with the edges f1;2g and f1;3g, it cannot be constructed.
Finally, at the third step of the algorithm, one of the edges f0;1g and f0;2g
may be formed. Depending on whether f0;1g or f0;2g is formed, the Kruskal's
Algorithm determines the mcst ff0;1g;f1;2g;f1;3gg or ff0;2g;f1;2g; f1;3gg,
respectively.
2.1.2 Kruskal cones
The basic idea behind Kruskal's algorithm is to consider edges one by one ac-
cording to non-decreasing cost. This idea leads to the classi¯cation of mcst
situations on the basis of the orders of the edges considered in Kruskal's algo-
rithm.
We de¯ne the set §EN0 of linear orders on EN0 as the set of all bijections
¾ : f1;:::;jEN0jg ! EN0, where jEN0j is the cardinality of the set EN0. For each
mcst situation < N0;w > there exists at least one linear order ¾ 2 §EN0 such






For any ¾ 2 §EN0 we de¯ne the set
K¾ = fw 2 I R
EN0
+ j w(¾(1)) · w(¾(2)) · ::: · w(¾(jEN0j))g:
The set K¾ is a cone in I R
EN0
+ , which we call the Kruskal cone with respect to
¾. One can easily see that
S
¾2§EN0 K¾ = I R
EN0
+ . For each ¾ 2 §EN0 the cone
K¾ is a simplicial cone with generators e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg, where
e¾;1(¾(j)) = 1 for all j 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg, and for each k 2 f2;:::;jEN0jg
e¾;k(¾(1)) = e¾;k(¾(2)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(k ¡ 1)) = 0
and
e¾;k(¾(k)) = e¾;k(¾(k + 1)) = ::: = e¾;k(¾(jEN0j)) = 1:
(2.1)16 CHAPTER 2. CONNECTION SITUATIONS AND GAMES
This implies that each w 2 K¾ can be written in a unique way as a non-negative
linear combination of these generators. To be more concrete, for w 2 K¾ we
have




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k: (2.2)




¾2§EN0 K¾, if we identify an mcst situ-
ation < N0;w > with w.
Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We can con-
sider a sequence of precisely jEN0j + 1 graphs < N0;F¾;0 >;< N0;F¾;1 >;:::;
< N0;F¾;jEN0j > such that F¾;0 = ;, F¾;k = F¾;k¡1 [ f¾(k)g for each k 2
f1;:::;jEN0jg. For each graph < N0;F¾;k >, with k 2 f0;1;:::;jEN0jg, let
¼¾;k be the partition of N0 consisting of the connected components of N0 in
< N0;F¾;k >.
Remark 2.1.1 For each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, ¼¾;k is either equal to ¼¾;k¡1 or is
obtained from ¼¾;k¡1 by forming the union of two elements of ¼¾;k¡1.
Now, we de¯ne recursively the function ½¾ : f0;1;:::;jNjg ! f0;1;:::;jEN0jg
by
² ½¾(0) = 0
² ½¾(j) = minfk 2 f½¾(j ¡ 1) + 1;:::;jEN0jgj¼¾;k 6= ¼¾;½
¾(j¡1)g
for each j 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
Note that ¼¾;½
¾(i) 6= ¼¾;½
¾(j) for each i;j 2 f0;1;:::;jNjg with i 6= j, and
¾(½¾(1));:::;¾(½¾(jNj)) correspond to the jNj formed edges in the Kruskal's
algorithm when the order ¾ of the edges is considered.
Example 2.1.3 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 2.1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;3g,
¾(2) = f1;2g, ¾(3) = f2;3g, ¾(4) = f0;1g, ¾(5) = f0;2g, ¾(6) = f0;3g.
The sequence of seven graphs < N0;F¾;k > and the corresponding sequence of2.2. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND MCST GAMES 17









Then, ½¾(0) = 0, ½¾(1) = 1, ½¾(2) = 2, ½¾(3) = 4.
2.2 Cooperative game theory and mcst games
Next, we recall some basic game theoretical notions. A cooperative cost game
or cost game is a pair (N;c), where N denotes the ¯nite set of players and
c : 2N ! I R is the characteristic function, with c(;) = 0 (here 2N denotes
the power set of player set N). Often we identify a cost game (N;c) with the
corresponding characteristic function c. A group of players T µ N is called a
coalition and c(T) is called the cost of this coalition. The class of all cost games
with N as set of players is denoted by GN. Let HN µ GN. We call a map
Ã : HN ! I RN a value if it assigns to every cost game (N;c) 2 HN one payo®
vector (or cost allocation) in I RN. A payo® vector x 2 I RN is e±cient for a cost
game (N;c) 2 GN if we have
P
i2N xi = c(N). A value Ã is e±cient if we have
that Ã(c) is an e±cient payo® vector for each c 2 HN. A value Ã : HN ! I RN
is called linear if Ã(¯v +°u) = ¯Ã(v)+°Ã(u) for all games v;u 2 HN and real
numbers ¯;° 2 I R such that ¯v + °u 2 HN.
A particular set, possibly empty, of payo® vectors of a cost game (N;c) is the
core, which is de¯ned as the set of e±cient payo® vectors for which no coalition
has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N. In formula
core(c) = fx 2 I RNj
X
i2S
xi · c(S) 8S 2 2N n f;g;
X
i2N
xi = c(N)g:18 CHAPTER 2. CONNECTION SITUATIONS AND GAMES
A game (N;c) is called a concave game if the marginal contribution of any player
to any coalition is not less than his marginal contribution to a larger coalition,
i.e. if it holds that
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) ¸ c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T) (2.3)
for all i 2 N and all S µ T µ N n fig.
We de¯ne the set §N of possible orders on the set N as the set of all bijections
¿ : f1;:::;jNjg ! N, where jNj is the cardinality of the set N and where
¿(i) = j means that with respect to ¿, player j is in the i-th position.
Let (N;c) be a cooperative cost game. For ¿ 2 §N, the marginal vector
m¿(c) is de¯ned by
m¿
i (c) = c([i;¿]) ¡ c((i;¿)) for all i 2 N;
where [i;¿] = fj 2 N : ¿¡1(j) · ¿¡1(i)g is the set of predecessors of i with
respect to ¿ including i, and (i;¿) = fj 2 N : ¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i)g is the set of
predecessors of i with respect to ¿ excluding i. In a coherent way with respect
to previous notations, we will indicate the set [i;¿] [ f0g and (i;¿) [ f0g as
[i;¿]0 and (i;¿)0, respectively. For instance, for each k 2 f1;:::;jNjg and for
each l 2 f2;:::;jNjg, the set [¿(k);¿]0 = f0;¿(1);:::;¿(k)g and (¿(l);¿)0 =
f0;¿(1);:::;¿(l ¡ 1)g, which will be denoted shorter as [¿(k)]0 and (¿(l))0, re-
spectively.
The most well-known value in the theory of cost games is the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953)). The Shapley value Á(c) of a cost game (N;c) is de¯ned as the







for all i 2 N: (2.4)
A population monotonic allocation scheme or pmas (Sprumont (1990)) of




xS;i = c(S) for all S 2 2Nnf;g;
ii) xS;i ¸ xT;i for all S;T 2 2Nnf;g and i 2 N with i 2 S ½ T.2.2. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND MCST GAMES 19
A pmas provides a cost allocation vector for every coalition in a monotonic
way, i.e. the cost allocated to some player decreases if the coalition to which he
belongs becomes larger.
Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation. The minimum cost spanning tree game
(N;cw) (or simply cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is de¯ned by
cw(S) = minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on S0g
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
We denote by MCST
N the class of all mcst games corresponding to mcst
situations in WN
0
. For each ¾ 2 §EN0, we denote by G¾ the set fcw j w 2
K¾g which is a cone. We can express MCST




¾2§EN0 G¾, and we would like to point out that MCST
N
itself is not a cone if jNj ¸ 2.
Example 2.2.1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 2.1.
If S = f1;2g then a minimum cost spanning network for S is ¡ = ff1;2g;
f0;1gg with cost 36, whereas the minimum cost spanning network for S = f3g
is ¡ = ff0;3gg with cost 26. Proceeding in this way we ¯nd that the mcst game
(N;cw), corresponding to < N0;w >, is given by
cw(123) = 48;
cw(12) = 36; cw(13) = 36; cw(23) = 44;
cw(1) = 24; cw(2) = 24; cw(3) = 26:
We call a map F : WN
0
! I RN assigning to every mcst situation w a unique cost
allocation in I RN a solution. A solution F is e±cient if we have
P
i2N Fi(w) =
w(¡) for each w 2 WN
0
, where ¡ is a spanning network on N0 of minimal cost.
A solution F has the carrier property if Fi(w) = 0 for each w 2 WN
0
and for
each i 2 N such that i is (w;N0)-connected to 0.
The core C(cw) of an mcst game cw 2 MCST
N is nonempty (Granot and
Huberman (1981), Bird (1976)) and, given an mcst ¡ (with no cycles) for N0
in the mcst situation w, one can easily ¯nd an element in the core looking at
the algorithm of Prim described in Section 2.1.1. If one assigns the cost of an20 CHAPTER 2. CONNECTION SITUATIONS AND GAMES
edge, which is formed in some step of the algorithm, to the player who just gets
a connection with the source, directly or indirectly, then one obtains a core ele-
ment of the corresponding mcst game (see Bird (1976) for more details). In the
following example we will illustrate that such a procedure does not necessarily
generate a pmas of the corresponding mcst game.
Example 2.2.2 Consider the complete weighted graph < N0; ~ w > with N0 =































Figure 2.3: The cost function ~ w on Ef0;1;2;3g.
algorithm for the mcst situation < f0;1;2;3g; ~ w > yields the formation of edge
f0;1g ¯rst, followed by the formation of edge f1;3g and edge f2;3g. The cost
of edge f0;1g is assigned to player 1, the cost of edge f1;3g to player 3 and
the cost of edge f2;3g to player 2. Following the same procedure for all other
coalitions we get the following table
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 6 8 13
f1;2g 6 17 ¤
f1;3g 6 ¤ 13
f2;3g ¤ 17 8
f1g 6 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 17 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 18
This table does not provide a pmas of the corresponding mcst game (f1;2;3g;
c ~ w): in coalition S = f2;3g player 3 has to pay 8 which is strictly less than the
amount 13 which he has to pay in the larger coalition N = f1;2;3g.2.2. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY AND MCST GAMES 2122 CHAPTER 2. CONNECTION SITUATIONS AND GAMESChapter 3




In Example 2.2.2 it has been provided an mcst situation where the allocation
method introduced by Bird (1976) does not generate a pmas of the correspond-
ing mcst game. But it is not clear, up to this point of the story, whether it is
possible to ¯nd a solution for mcst situations which is always able to generate
a pmas. Solving this problem is particularly valuable in applications where the
cardinality of the set of agents can vary in time.
Consider for instance the mcst situation introduced in Example 2.1.1. Prim's
Algorithm may ¯rst form edge f0;1g at the ¯rst step, then f1;2g, and ¯nally
f1;3g and the Bird rule yields the core allocation x = (24;12;12).
Suppose now that a fourth employee is asking whether he can join the car-
poolers 1;2; and 3. The cost of driving from employee 4 to the other employees
and to the ¯rm are given in Figure 3.1, as well as a minimum spanning tree for
the new situation. Application of the Bird rule to this new situation yields the








































Figure 3.1: The cost of driving and a minimum spanning tree in the new situa-
tion.
allocation x = (12;22;12;10). In the new situation employee 2 has to pay 22,
whereas in the old situation he only paid 12. Therefore, if the employees use
the Bird rule in order to divide joint costs, employee 2 will veto the entrance
of employee 4. Note that if Prim's Algorithm applied to the mcst situation in
Example 2.1.1 would have formed edge f0;2g at the ¯rst step, then f1;2g, and
¯nally f1;3g, bringing to the mcst ff0;2g;f1;2g; f1;3gg, the Bird rule would
have provided the allocation (12;24;12). With respect to this allocation in the
mcst situation of Figure 2.1, according to the Bird rule in the new mcst situation
of Figure 3.1, no employees would have put a veto on the entrance of employee
4.
The central question in this chapter is whether every minimum cost span-
ning tree game has a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) (Sprumont
(1990)), which is an allocation scheme that provides a core element for the game
and all its subgames and which, moreover, satis¯es a monotonicity condition in
the sense that players have to pay less in larger coalitions. We will answer this
question in the a±rmative and we will provide the Subtraction Algorithm, that
computes for every minimum cost spanning tree game a pmas. We will show that
this algorithm is closely related to Kruskal's algorithm for ¯nding a minimum
spanning tree (Kruskal (1956)). The Subtraction Algorithm is based upon a
decomposition theorem, which shows that every minimum cost spanning tree
game can be written as a non-negative combination of minimum cost spanning
tree games corresponding to simple mcst situations.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the decomposition theo-3.2. SIMPLE MCST GAMES AND THE DECOMPOSITION THEOREM 25
rem is provided and minimum cost spanning tree games corresponding to simple
mcst situations are studied. The Subtraction Algorithm is presented in Section
3.3. This chapter is based on Norde, Moretti, Tijs (2004).
3.2 Simple mcst games and the decomposition
theorem
If the cost of all edges in Ca(w) are lowered by the cost of an edge in Ca(w)
with minimal cost we are left with a cost function with smaller carrier. The
following lemma establishes a relation between the corresponding mcst games.
Lemma 3.2.1 Let w 2 WN
0
be a cost function with Ca(w) 6= ; and let ® :=
minfw(l) : l 2 Ca(w)g. Let w0 be the simple cost function de¯ned by w0(l) := 1
if l 2 Ca(w) and w0(l) := 0 otherwise. Let w00 be the cost function de¯ned by
w00(l) := w(l) ¡ ®w0(l) for every l 2 EN0. Finally, let c, c0 and c00 be the mcst
games corresponding to w, w0 and w00 respectively. Then, we have w = ®w0+w00
and c = ®c0 + c00.
Proof It follows by de¯nition that w = ®w0 + w00. In order to prove that
c = ®c0 + c00, i.e. c(S) = ®c0(S) + c00(S) for every S 2 2Nnf;g, let S 2 2Nnf;g.
Let ¡0 be a minimum cost spanning network for S in w0 without cycles, i.e. ¡0 is
a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w0. Write ¡0 = L0[L1 where L0 := fl 2
¡0 : w0(l) = 0g and L1 := fl 2 ¡0 : w0(l) = 1g. Clearly, j¡0j = jL0j + jL1j. Since
¡0 is a tree we also have j¡0j = jSj. Hence, c0(S) = w0(¡0) = jL1j = jSj ¡ jL0j.
It su±ces to show that there exists a minimum cost spanning tree ¡00 for S
in w00 with L0 µ ¡00. Since then ¡00 contains at most j¡00nL0j = jSj ¡ jL0j
edges in Ca(w0) and hence w0(¡00) · jSj ¡ jL0j = w0(¡0). Therefore, ¡00 is
also a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w0. Having w = ®w0 + w00 and
the fact that ¡00 is a minimum cost spanning tree for S in both w0 and w00 we
may conclude that ¡00 is also a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w. So,
c(S) = w(¡00) = ®w0(¡00) + w00(¡00) = ®c0(S) + c00(S).
In order to show that there is a minimum cost spanning tree ¡00 for S in w00
with L0 µ ¡00 take an arbitrary minimum cost spanning tree ¡ for S in w00.
If L0 µ ¡ the proof is ¯nished. If L0 6µ ¡ choose an l 2 L0n¡. Since ¡ [ flg26 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
contains a cycle C, whereas ¡0, and hence L0, do not contain cycles, we can ¯nd
an edge l0 2 C with l0 = 2 L0. De¯ne ~ ¡ := (¡ [ flg)nfl0g. Since w00(l) = 0 and
w00(l0) ¸ 0 we ¯nd that also ~ ¡ is a minimum cost spanning tree for S in w00.
Moreover j~ ¡ \ L0j = j¡ \ L0j + 1. Repeating this argument results in the tree
¡00 with the desired properties.
The following decomposition theorem shows that every minimum cost span-
ning tree game can be written as a non-negative combination of minimum cost
spanning tree games corresponding to simple mcst situations.
Theorem 3.2.2 Let w 2 WN
0
be a cost function with Ca(w) 6= ; and let c
be the corresponding mcst game. Then, there exists a sequence of simple cost
functions w1;:::;wk, with Ca(w) = Ca(w1) ¾ Ca(w2) ¾ ¢¢¢ ¾ Ca(wk), and











Proof The proof is by induction to jCa(w)j.
If jCa(w)j = 1 then Ca(w) has a unique element, say l¤. De¯ning ® := w(l¤)
and the simple cost function w1 by w1(l¤) := 1 and w1(l) := 0 if l 6= l¤ we
clearly have w = ®1w1. Moreover, if c1 is the mcst game corresponding to w1
one easily veri¯es that c = ®1c1.
Now, let m 2 I N;m ¸ 2 and suppose that the assertion has been proved for
every cost function w with jCa(w)j · m ¡ 1. Consider a cost function w with
jCa(w)j = m. According to Lemma 3.2.1 there is a simple cost function w1,
namely the simple cost function with the same carrier as w, a positive number
®1 and a cost function w00 with Ca(w00) ½ Ca(w) such that w = ®1w1 +
w00. Moreover, if c1 and c00 are the mcst games corresponding to w1 and w00
respectively, we have c = ®1c1 + c00. Application of the induction hypothesis to
w00 ¯nishes the proof.3.2. SIMPLE MCST GAMES AND THE DECOMPOSITION THEOREM 27





¾2§EN0 K¾, where K¾ is the Kruskal cone with respect to ¾, ¾ 2 §EN0,
introduced in Section 2.1.2. As we already remarked in relation (2.2), w 2 K¾
can be written in a unique way as a non-negative linear combination of the
generators of the simplicial cone K¾.
Example 3.2.1 Consider the cost function w of Example 2.1.1. Note that
w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;3g, ¾(2) = f1;2g, ¾(3) = f2;3g, ¾(4) = f0;1g,
¾(5) = f0;2g, ¾(6) = f0;3g. Hence, by relation (2.2), we have




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k
= 12e¾;1 + (12 ¡ 12)e¾;2 + (20 ¡ 12)e¾;3
+(24 ¡ 20)e¾;4 + (24 ¡ 24)e¾;5 + (26 ¡ 24)e¾;6 =
= 12e¾;1 + 8e¾;3 + 4e¾;4 + 2e¾;6:
In terms of Theorem 3.2.2 we may write
w = ®1w1 + ®2w2 + ®3w3 + ®4w4
where ®1 = 12;®2 = 8;®3 = 4 and ®4 = 2, and the simple cost functions
w1;:::;w4 are speci¯ed by
edge l f1;3g f1;2g f2;3g f0;1g f0;2g f0;3g
w1(l) = e¾;1(l) 1 1 1 1 1 1
w2(l) = e¾;3(l) 0 0 1 1 1 1
w3(l) = e¾;4(l) 0 0 0 1 1 1
w4(l) = e¾;6(l) 0 0 0 0 0 1
Computing the mcst games c1;:::;c4 corresponding to w1;:::;w4 respectively,
we get
coalition S f1g f2g f3g f1,2g f1,3g f2,3g f1,2,3g
c1(S) 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
c2(S) 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
c3(S) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
c4(S) 0 0 1 0 0 0 028 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
One easily veri¯es that
P4
i=1 ®ici coincides with the mcst game c, as computed
in Example 2.2.1.
3.3 The Subtraction Algorithm for population
monotonic allocation scheme (pmas)'s gen-
eration
In this section we will focus on simple cost functions. We show that an mcst
game corresponding to a simple cost function has a population monotonic allo-
cation scheme. Using Theorem 3.2.2 we obtain as a corollary that every mcst
game has a population monotonic allocation scheme.
Let w be a simple cost function and let S 2 2Nnf;g be a coalition. Two
nodes i and j in S[f0g are (w;S0)-connected if there exists a sequence of nodes
i = i0;:::;ik = j in S [ f0g with w(fis;is+1g) = 0 for every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g.
A (w;S0)-component of S[f0g is a maximal subset of S[f0g with the property
that any two nodes in this subset are (w;S0)-connected. The number of (w;S0)-
components is denoted by n(w;S0). Clearly, the collection of (w;S0)-components
forms a partition of S [ f0g.
Lemma 3.3.1 Let w be a simple cost function and let c be the corresponding
mcst game. Then, we have
c(S) = n(w;S0) ¡ 1
for every S 2 2Nnf;g.
Proof Let S 2 2Nnf;g. If n(w;S0) = 1 then S [ f0g is the unique (w;S0)-
component. Therefore, ¡ = fl 2 EN0 : l µ S [ f0g;w(l) = 0g is a spanning
network for S with w(¡) = 0. Hence, c(S) = 0 = n(w;S0) ¡ 1.
Now, suppose n(w;S0) ¸ 2. Let C0;C1;:::;Ck (k ¸ 1) be all (w;S0)-compo-
nents. Clearly, S[f0g = [k
i=0Ci and n(w;S0) = k+1. Without loss of generality3.3. THE SUBTRACTION ALGORITHM FOR POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEME (PMAS)'S GENERATION 29
we may assume that 0 2 C0. For every i 2 f1;:::;kg select some node ni 2 Ci.
Consider the network
¡ = fl 2 EN0 : l µ S [ f0g;w(l) = 0g [ ffni;0g : i 2 f1;:::;kgg:
The network ¡ is a spanning network for S: nodes in C0 are connected with
source 0 via edges in ¡ of zero cost, and nodes in Ci with i 2 f1;:::;kg are
connected with the source via node ni. Moreover w(¡) = k. It su±ces to
show that for any spanning tree ¡0 for S we have w(¡0) ¸ k, since then ¡
is a minimum cost spanning network for S in w, and hence we have c(S) =
w(¡) = k = n(w;S0) ¡ 1. So, let ¡0 be a spanning tree for S. De¯ne, for every
i 2 f0;:::;kg, ¡i := ¡0 \ fl 2 EN0 : l µ Ci;w(l) = 0g. Since ¡0, and hence ¡i,
does not contain cycles we have j¡ij · jCij ¡ 1 for every i 2 f0;:::;kg. Write
¡0 = L0 [ L1 where L0 := fl 2 ¡0 : w(l) = 0g and L1 := fl 2 ¡0 : w(l) = 1g.








jCij ¡ (k + 1) = jSj + 1 ¡ (k + 1) = jSj ¡ k:
Therefore,
w(¡0) = jL1j = j¡0j ¡ jL0j = jSj ¡ jL0j ¸ k:
Example 3.3.1 Consider the complete weighted graph < N0;w > with N0 =
f0;:::;8g and simple cost function w speci¯ed by fl 2 EN0 : w(l) = 0g =
ff0;1g;f2;3g;f2;4g;f3;4g;f4;5g;f6;7gg. Let c be the corresponding mcst game.
The edges with zero cost are depicted in Figure 3.2. Clearly, f0;1g, f2;3;4;5g,
f6;7g and f8g are all (w;N)-components. Consequently, c(N) = n(w;N)¡1 =
4 ¡ 1 = 3. If we consider for example coalition S = f2;3;5;6g we get that
f0g, f2;3g, f5g and f6g are all (w;S0)-components. Consequently, we also have
c(S) = n(w;S0) ¡ 1 = 4 ¡ 1 = 3.
In order to show that an mcst game corresponding to a simple cost function has
a pmas we need some more notation. In the following, if w 2 WN
0
is a simple
cost function, S 2 2Nnf;g and i 2 S then the (w;S0)-component to which i






















Figure 3.2: The cost function of Example 3.3.1.
De¯nition 3.3.1 Let w 2 WN
0
be a simple cost function and let ¿ 2 §N. The
scheme x¿;w = (x
¿;w





> > > <
> > > :
0 if 0 2 Ci(w;S);
0 if 0 = 2 Ci(w;S) and ¿¡1(i) 6= min
j2Ci(w;S)
¿¡1(j);
1 if 0 = 2 Ci(w;S) and ¿¡1(i) = min
j2Ci(w;S)
¿¡1(j);
for every S 2 2Nnf;g and for every i 2 S.
The scheme x¿;w provides for every coalition S 2 2Nnf;g a division of the cost
c(S) in the following way: all members of the (w;S0)-component containing the
source 0 do not have to pay anything whereas the (unit) cost of all other (w;S0)-
components is allocated to the member in the component with the lowest index
according to ¿.
Example 3.3.2 Consider the simple cost function w of Example 3.3.1 and let
¿ 2 §N be given by ¿¡1(1) = 2, ¿¡1(2) = 7, ¿¡1(3) = 5, ¿¡1(4) = 3, ¿¡1(5) =

















N;8 = 1. Moreover, for S = f2;3;5;6g we get
x
¿;w







In the following lemma we prove that the scheme x¿;w is a pmas for the mcst
game corresponding to simple cost function w.
Lemma 3.3.2 Let w be a simple cost function, cw the corresponding mcst game,
and ¿ 2 §N. Then, x¿;w is a pmas for cw.3.3. THE SUBTRACTION ALGORITHM FOR POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEME (PMAS)'S GENERATION 31
Proof Let S 2 2Nnf;g. Every (w;S0)-component which does not contain the
source 0 contains precisely one player i 2 S with x
¿;w





S;i = n(w;S0) ¡ 1 = c(S):





T;i it su±ces to show that x
¿;w
T;i = 1 implies x
¿;w
S;i = 1. So, assume
x
¿;w











As a corollary we get the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.3.3 Every mcst game has a pmas.
Proof The theorem follows directly from Theorem 3.2.2, Lemma 3.3.2 and
the observation that if x1 = (x1
S;i)S22Nnf;g;i2S is a pmas for game c1 and
x2 = (x2
S;i)S22Nnf;g;i2S is a pmas for game c2, then we have that ®x1 + ¯x2 :=
(®x1
S;i + ¯x2
S;i)S22Nnf;g;i2S is a pmas for ®c1 + ¯c2 for every ® ¸ 0 and every
¯ ¸ 0.
A basis for an algorithm that ¯nds a pmas in any mcst game is provided by The-
orem 3.2.2 and Lemma 3.3.2. Let w 2 WN
0
with Ca(w) 6= ; and let ¾ 2 §EN0
be such that w 2 K¾. As we already remarked in relation (2.2), w 2 K¾ can be
written in a unique way as a non-negative linear combination of the generators
of the simplicial cone K¾, in formula




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k:
Note that Ca(e¾;1) ¾ ¢¢¢ ¾ Ca(e¾;k). Theorem 3.2.2 tells us that the same
decomposition is true for the mcst games cw and c1;:::;cjEN0j, corresponding32 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
to w and e¾;1;:::;e¾;jEN0j, respectively:




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
ck:
Subsequently, ¯x some permutation ¿ 2 §N. Compute, for every k 2 f1;:::;
jEN0jg, the scheme x¿;e
¾;k
. According to Lemma 3.3.2 the scheme x¿;e
¾;k
is a




























For the same arguments used to prove Theorem 3.3.3, we have that P¿;w is a
pmas for the mcst game cw. For the sake of completeness note that for w = 0
the vectors P
¿;w
S;i := 0, for every S 2 2Nnf;g and each i 2 S, determine a pmas
for the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game cw = 0.
Example 3.3.3 Consider the cost function w of Example 2.1.1 and the corre-
sponding mcst game c introduced in Example 2.2.1. As we already noted in
Example 2.1.3 and Example 3.2.1, we have that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;3g,
¾(2) = f1;2g, ¾(3) = f2;3g, ¾(4) = f0;1g, ¾(5) = f0;2g, ¾(6) = f0;3g and, by
relation (2.2),




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k
= 12e¾;1 + (12 ¡ 12)e¾;2 + (20 ¡ 12)e¾;3
+(24 ¡ 20)e¾;4 + (24 ¡ 24)e¾;5 + (26 ¡ 24)e¾;6 =
= 12e¾;1 + 8e¾;3 + 4e¾;4 + 2e¾;6:
Let ¿ 2 §N be given by ¿¡1(i) = i for every i 2 N. By relation (3.3) we have3.3. THE SUBTRACTION ALGORITHM FOR POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEME (PMAS)'S GENERATION 33






S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 12 12 12
f1;2g 12 12 ¤
f1;3g 12 ¤ 12
f2;3g ¤ 12 12
f1g 12 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 12 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 12
+
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 8 0 0
f1;2g 8 0 ¤
f1;3g 8 ¤ 0
f2;3g ¤ 8 8
f1g 8 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 8 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 8
+
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 4 0 0
f1;2g 4 0 ¤
f1;3g 4 ¤ 0
f2;3g ¤ 4 0
f1g 4 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 4 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 4
+
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 0 0 0
f1;2g 0 0 ¤
f1;3g 0 ¤ 0
f2;3g ¤ 0 0
f1g 0 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 0 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 2
=
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 24 12 12
f1;2g 24 12 ¤
f1;3g 24 ¤ 12
f2;3g ¤ 24 20
f1g 24 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 24 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 26
An alternative way of describing the procedure used to de¯ne scheme P¿;w, is
the following algorithm.
Subtraction Algorithm for the computation of a pmas of an mcst
game.
Initialization: Let < N0;w > be an mcst situation and let
¿ 2 §N. De¯ne x = fxS;igS22Nnf;g;i2S by xS;i := 0
for every S 2 2Nnf;g;i 2 S.34 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
Algorithm: WHILE w 6= 0
DO ® := minfw(l) : l 2 EN0;w(l) > 0g
FOR every S 2 2Nnf;g;i 2 S:
BEGIN
IF 0 = 2 Ci(w;S) and
¿¡1(i) = minj2Ci(w;S) ¿¡1(j)
THEN xS;i := xS;i + ®
END
FOR every l 2 EN0 with w(l) > 0:
BEGIN
w(l) := w(l) ¡ ®
END
END
Output: A pmas (xS;i)S22Nnf;g;i2S for the game cw such that
xS;i = P
¿;w
S;i for each S 2 2N n f;g and i 2 S.
In the following two examples we illustrate the Subtraction Algorithm.
Example 3.3.4 Consider the cost function w of Example 2.1.1 and the corre-
sponding mcst game cw introduced in Example 2.2.1.
Let ¿ 2 §N be given by ¿¡1(i) = i for every i 2 N. In every step of
the Subtraction Algorithm some of the coe±cients xS;i will be raised by some
amount ®. Which coe±cients xS;i will be raised? Coe±cient xS;i will be raised
if there is no path in S [ f0g of zero cost from i to source 0 (0 = 2 Ci(w;S)),
and if there is no path in S [ f0g of zero cost from i to some node j 2 S with
¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i).
In the ¯rst step of the algorithm ® = 12, the cost of edges f1;2g and f1;3g.
All coe±cients xS;i will be raised by 12. Since all edges have positive cost, at
the end of step 1 the cost of every edge will be lowered by 12, so w(f1;2g) =
w(f1;3g) = 0.
In the second step of the algorithm ® = 8, the cost of edge f2;3g. Since there is
no path from i 2 f1;2;3g to source 0 of cost zero and f1;2g;f1;3g is a path of
zero cost, according to ¿ all coe±cients xS;1 with 1 2 S are raised by 8 together
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edge with positive cost will be lowered by 8, so w(f2;3g) = 0.
In the third step of the algorithm ® = 4, the cost of edges f0;1g and f0;2g.
Since there is no path from i 2 f1;2;3g to source 0 with zero cost, according to
¿ all coe±cients xS;1 with 1 2 S are raised by 4 together with xf2g;2, xf3g;3 and
xf2;3g;2 (since 2 and 3 are connected via a zero cost path and ¿¡1(2) < ¿¡1(3)).
At the end of step 2 the cost of every edge with positive cost will be lowered by
4, so w(f0;1g) = w(f0;2g) = 0.
In step 4 we have ® = 2, the cost of edge f0;3g. Now, all players are (w;S0)-
connected with the source, for each S 2 2N n f;;f3gg. Hence, only xf3g;3 is
raised by 2. At the end of step 4, the cost of the unique edge with positive
cost, edge f0;3g, is lowered by 2 and the algorithm stops. The pmas of the
corresponding mcst game, created in the Subtraction Algorithm, is given by
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 12 + 8 + 4 12 12
f1;2g 12 + 8 + 4 12 ¤
f1;3g 12 + 8 + 4 ¤ 12
f2;3g ¤ 12 + 8 + 4 12 + 8
f1g 12 + 8 + 4 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 12 + 8 + 4 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 12 + 8 + 4 + 2
=
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 24 12 12
f1;2g 24 12 ¤
f1;3g 24 ¤ 12
f2;3g ¤ 24 20
f1g 24 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 24 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 26
Example 3.3.5 Consider the complete weighted graph < N0;w > with N0 =































be given by ¿¡1(i) = i for every i 2 N. In the ¯rst step of the algorithm ® = 6,36 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
the cost of edge f0;1g. Since all edges have positive cost all coe±cients xS;i will
be raised by 6. At the end of step 1 the cost of every edge will be lowered by 6;
so, w(f0;1g) = 0.
In the second step of the algorithm ® = 2, the cost of edge f2;3g. Since edge
f0;1g is a path from 1 to source 0 of cost zero no coe±cient xS;1 with 1 2 S will
be raised in this step (and in subsequent) steps, whereas all other coe±cients
are raised by 2. At the end of step 2 the cost of every edge with positive cost
will be lowered by 2; so, w(f0;1g) = w(f2;3g) = 0.
In the third step of the algorithm ® = 5, the cost of edge f1;3g. Since edge f2;3g
is a path of zero cost which connects player 3 with player 2, which has a lower
index according to ¿ (¿¡1(2) < ¿¡1(3)), the coe±cients xf1;2;3g;3 and xf2;3g;3
will not be raised in this and further steps. All coe±cients, which remain to be
raised, are increased by 5 and at the end of step 3 the cost of every edge with
positive cost will be lowered by 5; so, w(f0;1g) = w(f1;3g) = w(f2;3g) = 0.
In step 4 we have ® = 4, the cost of edge f0;2g. Since player 2 is (w;f0;1;2;3g)-
connected with the source, via path f0;1g, f1;3g, f2;3g, and player 3 is (w;f0;1;
3g)-connected with the source, via path f0;1g, f1;3g, the corresponding coe±-
cients will not be raised anymore, whereas all coe±cients, which remain to be
raised, are increased by 4. At the end of step 4 the cost of every edge with
positive cost will be lowered by 4; so, w(f0;1g) = w(f0;2g) = w(f1;3g) =
w(f2;3g) = 0.
In step 5 we have ® = 1, the cost of edge f0;3g. Since edge f0;2g is a path from
2 to source 0 of zero cost the coe±cients xf1;2g;2, xf2;3g;2, and xf2g;2 will not
be raised any further. The only coe±cient which remains to be raised, xf3g;3,
is increased by 1. At the end of step 5 every edge with positive cost is lowered
by 1; so, w(f0;2g) = 0.
In step 6 we have ® = 3, the cost of edge f1;2g. Since edge f0;3g is a path
from 3 to source 0 of zero cost coe±cient xf3g;3 will not be raised anymore.
The cost of the only edge with positive cost, edge f1;2g, is lowered by 3 and
the algorithm stops. The pmas of the corresponding mcst game, created in the3.3. THE SUBTRACTION ALGORITHM FOR POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEME (PMAS)'S GENERATION 37
Subtraction Algorithm, is given by
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 6 6 + 2 + 5 6 + 2
f1;2g 6 6 + 2 + 5 + 4 ¤
f1;3g 6 ¤ 6 + 2 + 5
f2;3g ¤ 6 + 2 + 5 + 4 6 + 2
f1g 6 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 6 + 2 + 5 + 4 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 6 + 2 + 5 + 4 + 1
=
S 1 2 3
f1;2;3g 6 13 8
f1;2g 6 17 ¤
f1;3g 6 ¤ 13
f2;3g ¤ 17 8
f1g 6 ¤ ¤
f2g ¤ 17 ¤
f3g ¤ ¤ 18
Moreover, note that player 2 in coalition f1;2;3g has to pay the cost of edge
f1;3g, although he does not belong to this edge. In every step of the Subtraction
Algorithm a multiple of a simple cost function is subtracted from cost function
w; the same multiple of the pmas of the mcst game corresponding to this simple
cost function is added to fxS;igS22Nnf;g;i2S.
Remark 3.3.1 Consider an mcst situation < N0;w >. Let ¿ 2 §N and
let P¿;w be the pmas generated by the Subtraction Algorithm or via relation
(3.3). Let P¿(w) := P
¿;w
N be the corresponding core allocation in the mcst game
(N;cw). In the next chapters, the properties of the allocation vectors P¿(w)
(to which we will refer as P¿-values), for each w 2 WN
0
and ¿ 2 §N, will be
studied.
Remark 3.3.2 Consider a complete weighted graph < N0;w > where, in or-
der to simplify arguments, all edges have di®erent positive cost. Let ¿ 2 §N.
Moreover, let ¡ = fl1;:::;lng be the unique minimum cost spanning tree for N
with w(l1) < w(l2) < ¢¢¢ < w(ln). So, according to Kruskal's algorithm, edge l1
forms in the ¯rst step, edge l2 in the second step, etc. Let i1 2 N be the unique
player which is connected via network ¡1 = fl1g with the source 0 or with some
node j 2 N with ¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i1), let i2 be the unique player in Nnfi1g which
is connected via network ¡2 = fl1;l2g with the source 0 or with some node j 2 N
with ¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i2), etc. Note that in Example 3.3.5 we have l1 = f0;1g,38 CHAPTER 3. MCST GAMES AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
l2 = f2;3g, l3 = f1;3g, and i1 = 1, i2 = 3 and i3 = 2. One easily veri¯es
that P¿
ik(w) = w(lk) for every k 2 f1;:::;ng. Stated di®erently, the Subtraction
Algorithm allocates the cost of an edge which forms in some step of Kruskal's
algorithm to the player which gets a connection with the source or with a player
with a lower index according to ¿. This procedure to allocate the cost of an edge
which forms in some step of Kruskal's algorithm will be formalized in Example
4.2.4 to de¯ne the charge system C¿.Chapter 4
Construct and Charge rules
4.1 Introduction
As we already said in Chapter 2, to construct an mcst two methods are mainly
used: Prim's algorithm (Prim (1957)) and Kruskal's algorithm (Kruskal (1956)).
Both algorithms determine an mcst where exactly one edge is constructed in
every step of the algorithm. The total number of steps equals n. To divide the
cost of an mcst among the agents, both algorithms are suitable to de¯ne cost
allocation protocols which charge the agents with \fractions" of the cost of each
edge constructed in each step of the procedure.
In Feltkamp et al. (1994a,b), Norde et al. (2004), Branzei et al. (2004) and
Tijs et al. (2006a) particular allocation protocols based on Kruskal's algorithm
are studied. Recently, (Moretti et al. (2005)), we have discovered that we can
embed all these allocation protocols on mcst situations in a larger class of Con-
struct and Charge rules, formally introduced in Section 4.4. Construct and
Charge rules have been studied already in Feltkamp et al. (1994b) for minimum
cost spanning extension (mcse) situations. These mcse situations are general-
ized mcst situations in which some network can be present initially, which has
to be extended to a network connecting every player to the source. Feltkamp
et al. (1994b) proved that the allocations provided by Construct and Charge
rules are in the core of the game corresponding to an mcse situation (in case
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no network is present initially, an mcse situation is an mcst situation, and the
game is the corresponding mcst game).
Some Construct and Charge rules are independent of the selected mcst, but
others are not. For example, the Proportional rule (Feltkamp et al. (1994b)) is
a Construct and Charge rule and may provide di®erent cost allocations on the
same mcst situation, depending on the feasible orderings of the edges with re-
spect to increasing costs. The ERO-rule introduced in Feltkamp et al. (1994a,b)
and rebaptized as the P-value (Branzei et al. (2004)), the P¿-values (Norde et
al. (2004), Branzei et al. (2004)) and the Obligation rules (Tijs et al. (2006a))
are Construct and Charge rules which do not depend on the mcst selected,
providing a unique cost allocation on each mcst situation.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and characterize a class of rules for
mcst situations, which we call `conservative Construct and Charge' rules. An
interesting feature of such rules is that di®erent feasible orderings of the edges
lead to the same cost allocations. It turns out that the subclass of conservative
Construct and Charge rules coincides with the class of Obligations rules (Tijs
et al. (2006a)), that will be introduced in Section 4.5.
In Section 4.2 the de¯nition of a charge system is introduced, speci¯c exam-
ples are given and some basic properties are studied. In Section 4.3 conservative
charge systems are introduced and a related concept of potential is discussed.
Based on charge systems and orderings of the edges with respect to increas-
ing costs, the de¯nition of a Construct and Charge rule for mcst situations is
given in Section 4.4, together with some examples and properties for such rules.
In section 4.5 Obligation rules are introduced starting from the general notion
of obligation map, and some basic properties are studied. In Section 4.7 the
connection of Construct and Charge rules with Obligation rules is studied.
Sections 4.2-4.4 and 4.7 are based on Moretti, Tijs, Branzei, Norde (2008);
section 4.5 is based on Tijs, Branzei, Moretti, Norde (2006a); section 4.6 is
based on Branzei, Moretti, Norde, Tijs (2004).4.2. CHARGE SYSTEMS 41
4.2 Charge systems
To introduce charge systems we need some additional notations. Let N =
f1;:::;ng and ¢(N) = fx 2 I RN
+j
P
i2N xi = 1g. We denote by EN0 the set of
n-vectors of edges which form a spanning tree on N0, i.e.
EN0 = f(a1;:::;an) 2 (EN0)njfa1;:::;ang is a spanning network on N0g:
Note that the number of edges which form a spanning tree on N0 is n.
Given an element a = (a1;:::;an) 2 (EN0)n, we denote by ajj the restriction
of a to the ¯rst j components, that is ajj = (a1;:::;aj) for each j 2 N. Further,
for each j 2 N, we denote by ¦(ajj) the partition of N0 such that
¦(ajj) = fT µ N0jT is a connected component in < N0;fa1;:::;ajg >g:
Example 4.2.1 Consider the spanning tree depicted in Figure 4.1 on N0 =
f0;1;2;3;4g. Vectors a = (f2;3g;f0;1g;f3;4g;f0;3g) and b = (f3;4g;f2;3g;
f0;1g;f0;3g;) are elements of Ef0;1;2;3;4g. Note that aj3 = (f2;3g;f0;1g;f3;4g)
and bj3 = (f3;4g;f2;3g;f0;1g) implying that ¦(aj3) = ¦(bj3) = ff0;1g;
f2;3;4gg.















Figure 4.1: A spanning tree on N0 = f0;1;2;3;4g.
formation, that is adding the edge aj to the already formed graph ajj¡1, for
each j 2 N (note that when the ¯rst edge a1 is formed, the already formed
graph is < N0;; >. So, ¦(aj0) is the singleton partition of N0.).42 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
Now, let µ 2 £(N0), where £(N0) is the family of partitions of N0, and let
T µ N0. If T is a subset of a certain element of the partition µ, we denote this
element as S(µ;T).
De¯nition 4.2.1 A charge system C on N is a set of functions C = fC1;:::;Cng




i (ajj) = 0 for each i 2 S(¦(ajj¡1);f0g);
each j 2 N;
and each a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0;
(Involvement property): C
j
i (ajj) = 0 for each i 2 N n S(¦(ajj);aj)
each j 2 N;





i (ajj) = 1 for each i 2 N;
and each a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0:
A charge system speci¯es how to charge agents during the construction of a
spanning tree. Let a 2 EN0. First, the cost of each edge aj, for each j 2
N, should be totally charged among agents as soon as aj is formed. This
requirement makes a charge system promptly adaptable to modi¯ed situations,
where edges are formed according to di®erent orders (for instance, due to a
change in the route of transportation).
The connection property says that agents already connected to the source in
ajj¡1 should not be charged anymore. This property accounts for the fact that
there is no interest for agents already connected to the source in contributing
to the construction of other edges in the network.
The involvement property speci¯es that only agents who are connected to
nodes in aj in the graph ajj (i.e. agents involved in forming aj) should be
charged with fractions of the cost of aj. This property is particularly valu-
able in supply transportation networks, because the continuous control on the
charge procedure is simpler for customers which are directly involved in the
construction of the edges.
The total aggregation property says that when the construction of the span-
ning network corresponding to a is completed, each agent has been charged4.2. CHARGE SYSTEMS 43
for a total amount of fractions equal to 1. This property is a natural a priori
requirement of fairness in a charge system, since it guarantees that all agents
have duties on the same amount of total fractions of edges of a spanning tree.
The charge systems in Examples 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 will play a role in Section 4.7
to de¯ne special Construct and Charge rules. The intuition behind the charge
system of Example 4.2.2 is to charge each agent in a connected component
according to his `remaining obligation (RO)'. At the start the RO is 1 for every
agent. If in some step of the algorithm the connected component of an agent i is
linked to some other connected component, then agent i is charged according to
the following rule: if i is linked to a component containing the source, then i is
charged by his RO (leaving a RO of 0 for this agent); otherwise, if i is linked to
a component not containing the source, then i is charged half of his RO (leaving
a RO that is half of his RO in the previous step). The charge system of Example
4.2.3 charges the agents involved in forming the edge aj, for each j 2 N, taking
into account the cardinality of their connected components in the graphs ajj¡1
and ajj. As a result of this procedure, at each stage j 2 N, agents in the same
connected component have the same RO.
Example 4.2.2 Consider the charge system ~ C = f ~ C1;:::; ~ Cng on N such that





> > > > > > > > > > > > <




i if i 2 S(¦(ajj);aj)
and 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj);aj);
r
j
i if f0;ig µ S(¦(ajj);aj)
and 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj¡1);fig);
0 otherwise;
(4.1)
where the remaining obligation rj is de¯ned as
r
j





for each j 2 N, j > 1, and r1
i = 1 for each i 2 N.
The involvement property and the connection property of functions ~ C1; :::;
~ Cn are a direct consequence of relation (4.1). For the total aggregation property44 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
of functions ~ C1;:::; ~ Cn, ¯rst note that, by relation (4.2), for each i;j 2 N such
that i 2 S(¦(ajj);aj) and 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj);aj), the quantity
Pj
k=1 ~ Ck
i (ajk) < 1.
Then, by relation (4.1) the total aggregation property follows immediately.
In order to prove that function ~ Cj, j 2 N, takes values in ¢(N), we ¯rst
note by relations (4.1) that ~ C
j
i ¸ 0, for all i;j 2 N. Second, we prove by




i (ajj) = 1 for each j 2 N.






i (aj1) = 1.
Now, let j 2 f2;:::;ng and suppose that
P
i2N ~ Ck
i (ajk) = 1 for every k 2
f1;:::;j ¡ 1g. Let z 2 aj be one of the two nodes of edge aj such that 0 = 2
S(¦(ajj¡1);fzg) and let Kz µ f1;:::;j ¡ 1g be the set of indices k such that
ak is contained in S(¦(ajj¡1);fzg), in formula Kz = fk 2 f1;:::;j ¡ 1gjak µ
S(¦(ajj¡1);fzg). Note that jKzj = jS(¦(ajj¡1);fzg)j ¡ 1, since jKzj edges are























i (ajk) = jKzj;
(4.3)
where the second equality follows from the involvement property which speci¯es
that ~ Ck
i (ajk) = 0 for each i 2 S(¦(ajj¡1);fzg) and k 2 f1;:::;j ¡ 1g n Kz;
the third equality follows from the involvement property which speci¯es that
~ Ck
i (ajk) = 0 for each i 2 N n S(¦(ajj¡1);fzg) and k 2 Kz; ¯nally, the last
equality follows from the induction hypothesis. When edge aj is constructed,
a new partition of nodes ¦(ajj) forms. By the connection property, only nodes
which were not yet connected to 0 in ¦(ajj¡1) are charged. Then, we distinguish
two cases:4.2. CHARGE SYSTEMS 45


























































jS(¦(ajj¡1);fvg)j ¡ jS(¦(ajj¡1);fvg)j + 1
¢
= 1:
where the ¯rst equality follows by relation (4.1) and the involvement prop-
erty, and the third equality from relation (4.3).

























jS(¦(ajj¡1);fug)j ¡ jS(¦(ajj¡1);fug)j + 1
¢
= 1;
where the ¯rst equality follows by relation (4.1) and the involvement prop-
erty, and the third equality from relation (4.3).
We may conclude that ~ C1;:::; ~ Cn constitute a charge system.
Example 4.2.3 Consider the set of functions ^ C = f ^ C1;:::; ^ Cng on N such





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
1
jS(¦(ajj¡1);fig)j ¡ 1
jS(¦(ajj);fig)j if 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj);aj)
1
jS(¦(ajj¡1);fig)j if f0;ig µ S(¦(ajj);aj)
and 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj¡1);fig);
0 otherwise;
(4.4)46 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
for each i 2 N.
In order to check that the functions ^ C1;:::; ^ Cn constitute a charge system,
we ¯rst show that functions ^ C1;:::; ^ Cn take values in ¢(N). Note that for each






























jS(¦(ajj);aj)j = 1 + 1 ¡ 1 = 1:









where m 2 S(¦(ajj);aj) is such that 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj¡1);fmg).
The connection property of functions ^ C1;:::; ^ Cn directly follows by relation
(4.4) .
To prove that ^ C1;:::; ^ Cn satisfy the involvement property we note that if
for i;j 2 N we have that i = 2 S(¦(ajj);aj), then it follows that S(¦(ajj¡1);fig)
= S(¦(ajj);fig), since nothing is changed in the connected component of agent
i from stage j ¡ 1 to stage j. Consequently, by relation (4.4), we have that
^ C
j
i (ajj) = 0.
Finally, to prove that functions ^ C1;:::; ^ Cn satisfy the total aggregation prop-









where k 2 N is such that f0;ig µ S(¦(ajk);ak) and 0 = 2 S(¦(ajk¡1);fig).


























jS(¦(aj0);fig)j = 1:4.2. CHARGE SYSTEMS 47
Example 4.2.4 Given a bijection ¿ 2 §N, consider the set of functions C¿ =








1 if ¿¡1(i) = maxf¿¡1(k)jk 2 S(¦(aj1);a1) n f0gg;
0 otherwise;





> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if ¿¡1(i) = maxf¿¡1(k)jk 2 S(¦(ajj);aj) n f0g
and C
¿;l
k (ajl) = 0 for all l < jg;
0 otherwise:
One can easily verify that the functions C¿;1;:::;C¿;n take values in ¢(N) and
satisfy the connection property, involvement property and total aggregation
property. Hence these functions constitute a charge system.
Example 4.2.5 Consider the set of functions · C = f · C1;:::; · Cng on N such




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
1
2 if 0 = 2 S(¦(aj1);a1) and i 2 S(¦(aj1);a1)
1 if f0;ig µ S(¦(aj1);a1);
0 otherwise;










i (ajk);®g if i 2 S(¦(ajj);aj);
0 otherwise:







i (ajk);®g = 1: (4.5)48 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
From relation (4.5) it follows directly that the functions · C1;:::; · Cn take val-
ues in ¢(N). One can easily check that the functions · C1;:::; · Cn also satisfy
the connection property, involvement property and total aggregation property.
Hence, these functions constitute a charge system.
Next example shows a numerical application of the charge systems introduced
in Examples 4.2.2 - 4.2.5.
Example 4.2.6 Consider the spanning tree depicted in Figure 4.1 of Example
4.2.1 and consider the charge systems ~ C, ^ C, C¿ with ¿(i) = i for each i 2
f1;:::;ng, and · C, respectively introduced in Examples 4.2.2 - 4.2.5. In Tables
4.1 - 4.4 we show the respective charge systems corresponding to a and b of
Example 4.2.1.
j 1 2 3 4
~ Cj(ajj) (0; 1
2; 1
















Table 4.1: The charge system of Example 4.2.2 for a and b of Example 4.2.1.
j 1 2 3 4
^ Cj(ajj) (0; 1
2; 1
















Table 4.2: The charge system of Example 4.2.3 for a and b of Example 4.2.1.
j 1 2 3 4
C¿;j(ajj) (0;0;1;0)t (1;0;0;0)t (0;0;0;1)t (0;1;0;0;)t
C¿;j(bjj) (0;0;0;1)t (0;0;1;0)t (1;0;0;0)t (0;1;0;0;)t
Table 4.3: The charge system of Example 4.2.4, with ¿(i) = i for each i 2
f1;:::;4g, for a and b of Example 4.2.1.4.3. CONSERVATIVE CHARGE SYSTEMS 49
j 1 2 3 4
· Cj(ajj) (0; 1
2; 1
















Table 4.4: The charge system of Example 4.2.5 for a and b of Example 4.2.1.
4.3 Conservative Charge systems
In this section, special charge systems, which we call conservative, will play
a role. Consider a charge system C = fC1;:::;Cng on N. We de¯ne the
aggregate contribution of the charge system C on ajj, for each j 2 N and for






De¯nition 4.3.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N. We call C
a conservative charge system if for all j 2 N and for each pair a;b 2 EN0; with
¦(ajj) = ¦(bjj) we have
AC(ajj) = AC(bjj): (4.7)
The peculiarity of conservative charge systems is that they preserve the aggre-
gate contribution from the network construction history, i.e. the aggregate con-
tribution corresponding to ajj, for a 2 EN0 and j 2 N, is only dependent on the
partition of N0 induced by the connected components in < N0;fa1;:::;ajg >.
Example 4.3.1 It is easy to check that the charge system ~ C of Example 4.2.2
is not conservative. Consider, for instance, A
~ C(aj3) and A
~ C(bj3) in Example
4.2.1. As we noted in Example 4.2.1, ¦(aj3) = ¦(bj3) but, from Table 4.1 in
Example 4.2.6, we have that A
~ C(aj3) = (1; 3
4; 3
4; 1





Now, consider the charge system ^ C introduced in Examples 4.2.3. For each








jS(¦(ajj);fig)j if 0 = 2 S(¦(ajj);fig)
1 otherwise:50 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
Note that A
^ C
i (ajj) is only dependent on the partition of N0 induced by the
connected components in < N0;fa1;:::;ajg >, for each i;j 2 N, i.e. ^ C is a
conservative charge system.
Now, consider the charge system C¿ introduced in Examples 4.2.4. For each











i (ajj) is only dependent on the partition of N0 induced by the
connected components in < N0;fa1;:::;ajg >, for each j 2 f1;:::;ng and each
i 2 N, i.e. C¿ is a conservative charge systems.
Di®erently, it is easy to check that the charge system · C of Example 4.2.5 is
not conservative. Consider, for instance, A
· C(aj3) and A
· C(bj3) in Example 4.2.1.
As we noted in Example 4.2.1, ¦(aj3) = ¦(bj3) but, from Table 4.4 in Example
4.2.6, we have that A
· C(aj3) = (1; 5
6; 5
6; 1





Now, let C be a conservative charge system on N. We introduce the notion
of potential with respect to C, denoted by PC, which is a function on 2N
0
n f;g
with values in I RN.
De¯nition 4.3.2 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a conservative charge system on N.
For each S 2 2N
0
n f;g, consider an element a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0 such that
¦(ajj) = fS;figi2N0nSg, with j 2 N.
We de¯ne the potential of S with respect to the conservative charge sys-
tem C as the unique1 aggregate contribution corresponding to the partition
fS;figi2N0nSg; in formula
PC(S) := AC(ajj):
1Let a = (a1;:::;an); b = (b1;:::;bn) 2 EN0, and S 2 2N0
n f;g be such that ¦(ajj) =
¦(bjj) = fS;figi2N0nSg, with j 2 N. Recall that by De¯nition 4.3.1, we have AC(ajj) =
AC(bjj). So, the aggregate contribution corresponding to fS;figi2N0nSg is unique.4.3. CONSERVATIVE CHARGE SYSTEMS 51
The name of potential is inspired from physics where each conservative vector
¯eld has a potential. In a connection situation, an intuitive interpretation of
the potential PC(S), S 2 2N
0
n f;g, is as the level of \connection work" done
by nodes in N when fS;figi2N0nSg is the current set of connected components
and the conservative charge system C is used. Note that at the beginning of the
connection process, when no edges are formed and all the connected components
are singletons, the level of connection work performed by nodes should be zero.
This motivates us to use the convention that PC
i (fjg) = PC
i (f0g) = 0 for all
i;j 2 N.
Other elementary properties of PC : 2N
0
n f;g ! I RN
+ are collected in the
following lemma, which will play a role in Section 4.7 to prove Theorem 4.7.2.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a conservative charge system on N, let
PC be the potential w.r.t. C and let S 2 2N
0
n f;g. Then,







i (S) = jSj ¡ 1;
(c.3) if S µ T µ N0, then PC(S) · PC(T).
[Here eSnf0g 2 I RN
+ is such that e
Snf0g
i = 1 for each i 2 S n f0g and e
Snf0g
i = 0
for each i 2 N n S.]
Proof
(c.1) Let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0 and j 2 N be such that ¦(ajj) = fS;figi2N0nSg.
Then, for each i 2 N \ S
PC




i (ajk) = 1 ¡
Pn
k=j+1 Ck
i (ajk) = 1;
where the third equality follows from the total aggregation property of C
and the fourth equality follows from the connection property of C. From
the involvement property, we have PC
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N n S, which
¯nally proves property (c.1).
(c.2) If 0 2 S then property (c.2) follows directly from property (c.1).52 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
Now, consider the case 0 = 2 S. Let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0 and j 2 N be




















k=1 1 = jSj ¡ 1;
where the fourth equality follows from the involvement property. By the
involvement property it follows too that PC
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N n S,
which ¯nally proves property (c.2).
(c.3) Let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0 and j;l 2 N with l ¸ j be such that ¦(ajj) =
fS;figi2N0nSg and ¦(ajl) = fT;figi2N0nTg. Then,










k=1 Ck(ajk) = AC(ajl) = PC(T);
which concludes the proof of property (c.3).
Proposition 4.3.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a conservative charge system on
N. Let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 EN0 and j 2 N be such that ¦(ajj) = fS1;S2;:::;





Proof Let r 2 f1;2;:::;mg. Determine br(1);:::;br(pr) 2 f1;:::;jg such that
¦(abr(1);abr(2);:::; abr(pr)) = fSr;figi2N0nSrg, where pr = jSrj ¡ 1.
Then, for each i 2 N n Sr, by the involvement property of C
PC
i (Sr) = AC
i (abr(1);abr(2);:::;abr(pr)) = 0;
whereas for each i 2 N \ Sr
PC





i (a1;a2;:::;aj) = AC
i (ajj);4.4. CONSTRUCT & CHARGE RULES 53
where the second equality follows from the involvement property in the edge
sequence (abr(1);abr(2);:::;abr(j)), and the third equality follows from the fact
that C is conservative. Consequently,
Pm
r=1 PC(Sr) = AC(ajj).
4.4 Construct & Charge rules
At this point, we have all the ingredients to introduce the de¯nition of a Con-
struct & Charge rule.
De¯nition 4.4.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N. Let ¾ 2
§EN0 and let K¾ be the Kruskal cone w.r.t. ¾. The Construct and Charge





for each mcst situation w in the cone K¾.
Remark 4.4.1 Note that the CC-rule Â
~ C;¾, where ~ C is the charge system of
Example 4.2.2, corresponds to the Proportional rule introduced in Feltkamp et
al. (1994a).
The following example illustrates the CC-rules corresponding to the charge
systems introduced in Examples 4.2.2 - 4.2.5.
Example 4.4.1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > of Example 2.1.1. Let
¾ be as in Example 2.1.3 and ¾0(1) = f1;2g, ¾0(2) = f1;3g, ¾0(3) = f2;3g,
¾0(4) = f0;1g, ¾0(5) = f0;2g, ¾0(6) = f0;3g. Now, we apply De¯nition 4.4.1
to the charge systems introduced in Examples 4.2.2 - 4.2.5 to calculate the
allocations provided by the corresponding CC-rules on < N0;w >.
The charge system ~ C of Example 4.2.2 leads to
Â
~ C;¾(w)
= 12 ¤ (1
2;0; 1
2)t + 12 ¤ (1
4; 1
2; 1










= 12 ¤ (1
2; 1
2;0)t + 12 ¤ (1
4; 1
4; 1










The charge system ^ C of Example 4.2.3 leads to
Â
^ C;¾(w)
= 12 ¤ (1
2;0; 1
2)t + 12 ¤ (1
6; 2
3; 1










= 12 ¤ (1
2; 1
2;0)t + 12 ¤ (1
6; 1
6; 2




























The charge system · C of Example 4.2.5 leads to
Â
· C;¾(w)
= 12 ¤ (1
2;0; 1
2)t + 12 ¤ (1
3; 1
3; 1










= 12 ¤ (1
2; 1
2;0)t + 12 ¤ (1
3; 1
3; 1






· C;¾(w) 6= Â
· C;¾
0
(w).4.4. CONSTRUCT & CHARGE RULES 55
De¯nition 4.4.2 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N. We say that
C has the patch property if for all ¾1;¾2 2 §EN0:
ÂC;¾1(w) = ÂC;¾2(w)
for each w in the cone K¾1 \ K¾2.
If C = fC1;:::;Cng has the patch property, then we can de¯ne ÂC by
ÂC(w) = ÂC;¾(w) (4.9)
for all w 2 WN
0
, where ¾ 2 §EN0 is such that w 2 K¾. We will call ÂC the
CC-rule with respect to C.
Remark 4.4.2 Example 4.4.1 shows that the charge system ~ C introduced in
Example 4.2.2 and the charge system · C introduced in Example 4.2.5 do not
satisfy the patch property, so we cannot de¯ne Â
~ C and Â
· C via relation (4.9).
Theorem 4.4.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N. If C has the
patch property, then C is conservative.
Proof Suppose that C has the patch property and it is not conservative. Then,
we can ¯nd a j 2 N and a pair a = (a1;:::;an);b = (b1;:::;bn) 2 EN0; with
¦(ajj) = ¦(bjj) and AC(ajj) 6= AC(bjj):







0 if there exists r 2 f1;:::;mg s.t. i;j 2 Sr;
1 otherwise;
for each fi;jg 2 EN0. Let ¾1 2 §EN0 be such that ¾1(½¾1(k)) = ak for
each k 2 f1;:::;jg and ¾1(½¾1(l)) = dl for each l 2 fj + 1;:::;ng, where
(a1;:::;aj;dj+1;:::;dn) 2 EN0 and ½¾1 is de¯ned as in Section 2.1.2.
Let ¾2 2 §EN0 be such that ¾2(½¾2(k)) = bk for each k 2 f1;:::;jg and
¾2(½¾2(l)) = dl for each l 2 fj + 1;:::;ng, with (b1;:::;bj;dj+1;:::;dn) 2 EN0.56 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES













= eN ¡ AC(ajj);
where the third equality follows from the total aggregation property.
Similarly,
ÂC;¾2(w) = eN ¡
j X
r=1
Cr(bjr) = eN ¡ AC(bjj):
So, ÂC;¾1(w) 6= ÂC;¾2(w), which yields a contradiction with the fact that C
has the patch property.
4.5 Obligation rules
A di®erent approach to de¯ne allocation protocols is rooted on the concept of
obligations maps (Tijs et al. 2006) instead of the concept of charge systems.
Surprisingly, the two approaches are strongly connected, as it will be shown in
the next section.
Let ¢(N) = fx 2 I RN
+j
P
i2N xi = 1g. The sub-simplex ¢(S) of ¢(N) given
by ¢(S) = fx 2 ¢(N)j
P
i2S xi = 1g is called, for reasons to be clari¯ed later,
the set of obligation vectors of S.
An obligation function is a map o : 2N n f;g ! ¢(N) assigning to each S 2
2N n f;g an obligation vector
o(S) 2 ¢(S) (4.10)
in such a way that for each S;T 2 2N n f;g with S ½ T and for each i 2 S
oi(S) ¸ oi(T): (4.11)4.5. OBLIGATION RULES 57
Such an obligation function o on 2Nnf;g induces an obligation map ^ o : £(N0) !





for each µ 2 £(N0).
Note that if µ = fN0g, then the resulting empty sum is assumed, by de¯ni-
tion, to be the n-vector of zeroes: ^ o(µ) = 0 2 I RN.
Obligation maps are basic ingredients for Obligation rules: speci¯cally, they
play a central role in de¯ning the cost allocation protocol along the step-wise
connection procedure. Three interesting types of obligation maps are provided
in examples 4.5.1-4.5.3.
Example 4.5.1 Let o¤ : 2N n f;g ! ¢(N) be de¯ned by o¤(S) = e
S
jSj for each
S 2 2N n f;g, where eS is the n-vector such that eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and eS
i = 0 if







jS(µ;fig)j¡1 if 0 = 2 S(µ;fig)
0 otherwise;
(4.13)
for each µ 2 £(N0) and each i 2 N. Here S(µ;fig) 2 µ is the partition element
to which i belongs.
Note that o¤(S) is the barycenter of ¢(S) and for N = f1;2;3;4g, µ =
ff1;2g;f0;3g;f4gg we have ^ o¤(µ) = (1
2; 1
2;0;1).
Example 4.5.2 Given ¿ 2 §N, let o¿ on 2N n f;g be the obligation function






1 if ¿¡1(i) = minf¿¡1(k)jk 2 Sg
0 otherwise:
If N = f1;2;3;4g, µ = ff1;2g;f0;3g;f4gg and ¿¡1(i) = i for each i 2 N, then
^ o¿(µ) = o¿(f1;2g) + o¿(f4g) = (1;0;0;1).58 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
Example 4.5.3 Let º 2 I RN
++ be a vector of strictly positive real values. Let







j2S ºj if i 2 S
0 otherwise:
Then, oº is an obligation function. Note that if ºi = 1 for each i 2 N, then
oº
i (S) = o¤
i(S) for each S 2 2N n f;g, where o¤(S) is as in Example 4.5.1.
One can easily check that the obligation maps in Examples 4.5.1-4.5.3 satisfy
condition (4.11). Next example shows a map o : 2N n f;g ! ¢(N) assigning to
each S 2 2N nf;g an obligation vector o(S) 2 ¢(S) in such a way that condition
(4.11) is not satis¯ed implying that it is not an obligation function.






jSj¡1 if i 2 S and U * S
jUj¡1 if i 2 U and U µ S
0 otherwise:




3;4g) = (0; 1
2; 1
2;0). So, oU is not an obligation function since it does not satisfy
condition (4.11).
Remark 4.5.1 Let o²;o± : 2N n f;g ! ¢(N) be two distinct obligation func-
tions. For each ® 2 [0;1] let o® : 2Nnf;g ! I RN be de¯ned by o®(S) = ®o²(S)+












= 1. Moreover, since condition (4.11) holds both for o² and
o±, condition (4.11) holds for their convex combination o® too. Therefore,
o® is an obligation function which induces the corresponding obligation map
^ o®(µ) = ®^ o²(µ) + (1 ¡ ®)^ o±(µ) for each µ 2 £(N0).4.5. OBLIGATION RULES 59
De¯nition 4.5.1 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0). Let ¾ 2 §EN0. The
contribution matrix w.r.t ^ o and ¾ is the matrix D¾;^ o 2 I RN£jEN0j where
D
¾;^ o
ik = ^ oi(¼¾;k¡1) ¡ ^ oi(¼¾;k)
for each i 2 N and each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg.
Some characteristics of the contribution matrix are given in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.5.1 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0). Let ¾ 2 §EN0. Then,
D¾;^ o is a non-negative matrix for which each row sum is equal to 1 and the ½¾(j)-
th column sum is equal to 1 for each j 2 f1;:::;ng, whereas each k-th column
sum with k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n f½¾(j)jj 2 f1;:::;ngg is equal to 0.
Proof First, note that by Remark 2.1.1 and the de¯nition of obligation map
the matrix D¾;^ o is non-negative.




^ oi(¼¾;k¡1) ¡ ^ oi(¼¾;k)
¢
= ^ oi(¼¾;0) ¡ ^ oi(¼¾;jEN0j) = 1 ¡ 0 = 1
for each i 2 N.































for each j 2 f1;:::;ng, where in the last equality we use Remark 2.1.1. The
k-th column sums, for each k 2 f1;:::; jEN0jgnf½¾(j)jj 2 f1;:::;ngg, are equal








^ oi(¼¾;k¡1) ¡ ^ oi(¼¾;k)
¢
= 0:60 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
De¯nition 4.5.2 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0). Let ¾ 2 §EN0. We
de¯ne the map Á¾;^ o : K¾ ! I RN by
Á¾;^ o(w) = D¾;^ ow¾; (4.14)
for each mcst situation w in the cone K¾.






Onwards, let ek 2 I RjEN0j be the column vector such that ek
t = 1 if t = k
and ek
t = 0 for each t 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg n fkg. From Proposition 4.5.1 it follows
directly that the matrix ¹ D¾;^ o 2 I RN£n de¯ned by
¹ D¾;^ oej = D¾;^ oe½
¾(j) (4.15)
for each j 2 f1;:::;ng is a double stochastic matrix (i.e. all entries are non-
negative and each row sum and each column sum is equal to 1), and




Remark 4.5.2 Let ¾ 2 §EN0. Note that for each mcst situation w in the cone
K¾ and for each j 2 f1;:::;ng we have
¹ D¾;^ o
¤
ej = ^ Cj;
where ^ o¤ is the obligation map de¯ned in Example 4.5.1; ¹ D¾;^ o
¤
is de¯ned by
relation (4.15) on the contribution matrix w.r.t. ^ o¤ and ¾; ¹ D¾;^ o
¤
ej is the j-
th column of the double stochastic matrix ¹ D¾;^ o
¤
; ^ Cj is the j-th element of the








is the map de¯ned by relations (4.16) w.r.t. ¾ and ^ o¤, and Â
^ C;¾ is
the Construct & Charge rule w.r.t. ^ C and ¾.
Remark 4.5.3 Let ¾ 2 §EN0. Note that for each mcst situation w in the cone
K¾ and for each j 2 f1;:::;ng we have
¹ D¾;^ o
¿
ej = C¿;j;4.5. OBLIGATION RULES 61
where ^ o¿ is the obligation map de¯ned in Example 4.5.2; ¹ D¾;^ o
¿
is de¯ned by
relation (4.15) on the contribution matrix w.r.t. ^ o¿ and ¾; ¹ D¾;^ o
¿
ej is the j-th
column of the double stochastic matrix ¹ D¾;^ o
¿
; C¿;j is the j-th element of the








is the map de¯ned by relations (4.16) w.r.t. ¾ and ^ o¿, and ÂC
¿;¾ is
the Construct & Charge rule w.r.t. C¿ and ¾.
In order to de¯ne Obligation rules properly on the set WN
0
, we need Lemma
4.5.1. In the sequel, recall that, for each t 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, w¾
t is the t-th
coordinate of the vector w¾.
Lemma 4.5.1 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0); let ¾ 2 §EN0;w 2 K¾.
Suppose that, for some t 2 f1;:::; jEN0j ¡ 1g, w¾
t = w¾
t+1. Then, for the
ordering ¾0 2 §EN0 such that ¾0(i) = ¾(i) for each i 2 f1;:::;jEN0jgnft;t+1g,
¾0(t) = ¾(t + 1) and ¾0(t + 1) = ¾(t), we have that w 2 K¾
0
and Á¾;^ o(w) =
Á¾
0;^ o(w).
Proof It is obvious that w 2 K¾
0
. Let a = w¾
t . Note that ^ o(¼¾;k) = ^ o(¼¾
0;k) for
all k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg with k 6= t. This implies that w¾













0;t¡1) ¡ ^ o(¼¾
0;t)) + a(^ o(¼¾
0;t) ¡ ^ o(¼¾
0;t+1)) =
= a(^ o(¼¾
0;t¡1) ¡ ^ o(¼¾
0;t+1)) = a(^ o(¼¾;t¡1) ¡ ^ o(¼¾;t+1)) =
= a(^ o(¼¾;t¡1) ¡ ^ o(¼¾;t)) + a(^ o(¼¾;t) ¡ ^ o(¼¾;t+1)) =
= w¾
t D¾;^ oet + w¾
t+1D¾;^ oet+1:
(4.17)
So, D¾;^ ow¾ = D¾
0;^ ow¾
0
or, equivalently, Á¾;^ o(w) = Á¾
0;^ o(w).
By repeatedly using Lemma 4.5.1 we obtain
Proposition 4.5.2 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0). If w 2 K¾ \ K¾
0
with ¾;¾0 2 §EN0, then Á¾;^ o(w) = Á¾
0;^ o(w).62 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
This proposition makes it possible to de¯ne an Obligation rule with respect to
an obligation map on £(N0) as a map on WN
0
.
De¯nition 4.5.3 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0). The Obligation (O-
)rule w.r.t. ^ o is the map Á^ o : WN
0
! I RN de¯ned by
Á^ o(w) = Á¾;^ o(w) (4.18)
for each w 2 WN
0
, where ¾ 2 §EN0 is such that w 2 K¾.
Remark 4.5.4 The P-value (Feltkamp et al. (1994b), Branzei et al. (2004)),
that will be studied in depth in Section 4.6, is both an Obligation rule and a
Construct & Charge rule. In fact, by de¯nition, P(w) := Á^ o
¤
(w) for each w 2
WN
0
, and by Remark 4.5.2 Á^ o
¤
(w) = Á¾;^ o
¤
(w) = Â
^ C;¾(w) for each w 2 WN
0
,
where ¾ 2 §EN0 is such that w 2 K¾, and Â
^ C;¾ is the Construct and Charge
rule w.r.t. ^ C and ¾.
In an analogous way, the P¿-values (Norde et al. (2004), Branzei et al. (2004)),
with ¿ 2 §N, introduced in Section 3.3, are also both Obligation rules and Con-
struct & Charge rules. In fact, by Remark 3.3.1 and relation (3.4), P¿(w) =
Á^ o
¿
(w) for each w 2 WN
0
, and by Remark 4.5.3 Á^ o
¿




for each w 2 WN
0
, where ¾ 2 §EN0 is such that w 2 K¾ and ÂC
¿;¾ is the
Construct and Charge rule w.r.t. C¿ and ¾.
Next two examples provide an illustration of two obligation rules.
Example 4.5.5 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g



























and w¾ = (12;12;20;24;24;26)t.
Then, P(w) = Á^ o
¤
(w) = D¾;^ o
¤
w¾ = (16;16;16)t.4.5. OBLIGATION RULES 63
Example 4.5.6 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w of Example 2.1.1. Let ¿ 2 §N be such that ¿¡1(1) = 2, ¿¡1(2) = 3 and










1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0





and w¾ = (12;12;20;24;24;26)t.
Then, P¿(w) = Á^ o
¿
(w) = D¾;^ o
¿
w¾ = (12;12;24)t.
Now, we want to make clear that we have chosen the name \Obligation rule"
because such rules deal with \(remaining) obligations" of players for the cost of
edges along a step-wise connection procedure. Let ^ o be an obligation map on
£(N0) and let w 2 WN
0
. According to the corresponding Obligation rule Á^ o,
each player i 2 N is committed in paying, according to some speci¯c protocol,
fractions of edges summing up to 1 along a step-wise process. More precisely,
an Obligation rule allocates the cost of an edge which forms in each step k,
k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, of the Kruskal's algorithm to some players in N according
to the k-th column of the contribution matrix D¾;^ o, with ¾ 2 §EN0 such that
w 2 K¾. By Proposition 4.5.1, after each step k, the total quantity of fractions






ij = ^ oi(¼¾;k): (4.19)
Since equation (4.19) de¯nes the sum of remaining fractions of edges that play-
ers are obliged to pay after step k up to the end of the connection procedure,
we call ^ oi(¼¾;k) the (remaining) obligation for player i at step k.
We collect some interesting properties of Obligation rules in Proposition 4.5.3.
Proposition 4.5.3 The Obligation rules are e±cient, satisfy the carrier prop-
erty and form a convex set .
Proof Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0), let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN064 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
be such that w 2 K¾.
























where the second equality follows from Proposition 4.5.1 and where ¡ is a
spanning network on N0 of minimal cost. So, e±ciency is proved.
ii) Let i 2 N be a player who is (w;N0)-connected to the source 0. There
exists r 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg such that i is connected to 0 in F¾;r but not in
F¾;r¡1 and w(¾(r)) = 0. Moreover, by the de¯nition of an obligation map,
^ oi(¼¾;k) = 0 for k 2 fr;:::;jEN0jg. It follows by (4.18) that Á^ o
i(w) = 0
and then it is proved that Á^ o satis¯es the carrier property.
iii) Let ^ o²; ^ o± and ^ o®, with ® 2 [0;1], be as in Remark 4.5.1. Then,
®Á^ o
²

















w¾ = Á^ o
®
(w)
for every w 2 WN
0
and ¾ 2 §EN0 such that w 2 K¾, where the third
equality follows from Remark 4.5.1 and the de¯nition of D¾;^ o
®
. Then, it
is proved that the set of Obligation rules is a convex set.
4.6 The P-value
A special Obligation rule is the P-value, studied in Branzei et al. (2004). It
turns out that the P-value equals the Equal Remaining Obligations (ERO)4.6. THE P-VALUE 65
rule suggested by Jos Potters (which explains the name P-value) and which is
introduced in Feltkamp et al. (1994a).
De¯nition 4.6.1 The P-value is the map P : WN
0
! I RN, de¯ned by
P(w) = Á^ o
¤
(w) (4.20)
for each w 2 WN
0
and where Á^ o
¤
is the Obligation rule w.r.t. the obligation
map ^ o¤ of Example 4.5.1.
Example 4.5.5 provides an illustration of the P-value.
Remark 4.6.1 Let ¾ 2 §EN0. For each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg, consider the simple
mcst situation e¾;k. Then, for k > 1, each edge e 2 F¾;k¡1 has cost e¾;k(e) = 0.
Therefore, if i and j in N0 are connected in < N0;F¾;k¡1 >, then they are
also in the same (e¾;k;N0)-component. Conversely, if i and j are in the same
(e¾;k;N0)-component, then they are also connected in < N0;F¾;k¡1 > and as a
consequence, by equation (4.13), ^ o¤
i(¼¾;k¡1) = ^ o¤
j(¼¾;k¡1).
Using the linearity of P (or Á^ o
¤
) on K¾, an alternative way of calculating P(w),
which will be useful in the following, is as linear combination of P(e¾;k), k 2
f1;:::;jEN0jg, where ¾ 2 §EN0 is such that w 2 K¾ (see relation (2.2)). In
formula,




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
P(e¾;k): (4.21)












where the second equality follows from the fact that ^ o¤(¼¾;½
¾(n)) is the zero
vector. As we said at the beginning of this section, the P-value coincides with the
Equal Remaining Obligations (ERO) rule. The ERO-rule has been introduced in
Feltkamp et al. (1994) via an extension of Kruskal's algorithm. According to the
ERO-rule, at each stage k 2 f0;1;:::;jEN0jg of the algorithm, each player i 2
N pays exactly the di®erence between remaining obligations, i.e. ^ o¤
i(¼¾;k¡1) ¡
^ o¤
i(¼¾;k) for each i 2 N, as shown in Theorem 4.3 of Feltkamp et al. (1994). An66 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
axiomatic characterization of the ERO-rule using the properties of NE (Non-
Emptiness), FSC (Free-for-Source-Component), LOC (Local), E® (E±ciency),
ET (Equal Treatment) and IPCons (Inversely Proportional Consistency) is given
there. In Section 6.2 we provide an alternative axiomatic characterization.
We end this section with a proposition that enlightens the connection be-
tween the P-value and the P¿-values, ¿ 2 §EN0, according to Remark 4.5.4.




















Let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾.
To prove (4.24), note that for each i 2 N, the edge ¾(½¾(i)) connects two
disconnected subsets of vertices S;T 2 ¼¾;½
¾(i¡1). Then, for each player j 2











On the other hand, for players in S [ T, we have two possibilities regarding
the position of the source w.r.t. the sets S and T:
i) The source 0 belongs neither to S nor to T implying that for each j 2 T







> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if ¿¡1(j) = minf¿¡1(k)jk 2 Tg and
¿¡1(j) 6= minf¿¡1(k)jk 2 S [ Tg;
0 otherwise.





jSj+jTj whereas the fraction of orderings ¿ 2 §N such
that ¿¡1(j) = minf¿¡1(k)jk 2 Tg is equal to 1
jTj. Then, it follows that4.7. CONSERVATIVE CONSTRUCT & CHARGE RULES 67




































Similar arguments hold for each j 2 S too.
ii) The source 0 belongs either to S or to T. Without loss of generality,





























































A similar argument holds if 0 2 T.




4.7 Conservative Construct & Charge rules
The main result in this section is derived from the relation between Obligation
rules and conservative Construct & Charge rules introduced in the previous
sections.68 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
Remark 4.7.1 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0) and let C = fC1;:::;Cng
be a set of functions with Cj : fajj : a 2 EN0g ! ¢(N), for each j 2 N, such
that
Cj(ajj) = ^ o(¦(ajj¡1)) ¡ ^ o(¦(ajj)) (4.25)
for each a 2 EN0 and j 2 N. It is easy to see, via relation (4.12), that C satis¯es
the connection property and the involvement property. By Proposition 4.5.1, it
follows that C satis¯es the total aggregation property as well. As a consequence,
C is charge system on N.











r=1 w(¾(½¾(r)))Cr(¾(½¾(1));:::;¾(½¾(r))) = ÂC;¾(w):
(4.26)
Relation (4.26) shows that the class of Obligation rules is a subclass of the class
of CC-rules. The inclusion in the other way is not true, as indicated in Re-
mark 4.4.2, and proved by the fact that the CC-rule w.r.t. the charge system
introduced in Example 4.2.5 cannot be de¯ned via relation (4.9). Another coun-
terexample is the Proportional rule, i.e. the CC-rule w.r.t. the charge system
introduced in Example 4.2.2, that cannot be de¯ned via relation (4.9).
So, it makes sense to study for conservative charge systems the following
property.
De¯nition 4.7.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N. We say that
C has the obligation property if there exists an obligation map ^ o on £(N0) such
that
Cj(ajj) = ^ o(¦(ajj¡1)) ¡ ^ o(¦(ajj))
for each a 2 EN0 and j 2 N.
Theorem 4.7.1 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a charge system on N with the oblig-
ation property. Then, C has the patch property.
Proof Consider an obligation map ^ o on £(N0) such that
Cj(ajj) = ^ o(¦(ajj¡1)) ¡ ^ o(¦(ajj))
for each a 2 EN0 and j 2 N. The assertion that C has the patch property follows
directly by De¯nition 4.5.1 and relation (4.26) on the obligation rule Á^ o.4.7. CONSERVATIVE CONSTRUCT & CHARGE RULES 69
In the following theorem, we give a su±cient condition for charge systems
to satisfy the obligation property.
Theorem 4.7.2 Let C = fC1;:::;Cng be a conservative charge system on N.
Then, C has the obligation property.
Proof Let PC(S) be the potential of S with respect to the conservative charge
system C for each S 2 2N nf;g. Consider the map oC : 2N nf;g ! I RN
+ de¯ned
by
oC(S) = eS ¡ PC(S) (4.27)
for each S 2 2N n f;g, where eS 2 I RN
+ is such that eS
i = 1 for each i 2 S and
eS
i = 0 for each i 2 N n S. Note that for each j 2 N, we have
^ oC(¦(ajj¡1)) ¡ ^ oC(¦(ajj))
=
P















































k=1 Ck(ajk) = Cj(ajj);
where the third equality follows from Lemma 4.3.1.(c.1), the ¯fth equality fol-
lows from the fact that
P
S2µ eSnf0g = eN for each µ 2 £(N0) and the sixth
equality from Proposition 4.3.1.
We want to prove that oC is an obligation function, i.e. oC satis¯es the
properties (4.10) and (4.11).
By de¯nition, it follows directly that oC
i (S) = 0 for each i 2 N n S and
oC
i (S) ¸ 0 for each i 2 S and for each S 2 2N n f;g. Moreover, from (c.2) of











= jSj ¡ (jSj ¡ 1) = 1;70 CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCT AND CHARGE RULES
for each S 2 2N n f;g, implying that property (4.10) holds.
Finally, by (c.3) in Lemma 4.3.1, we have that for each S µ T µ N, S 6= ;,
and each i 2 S
oC
i (S) = 1 ¡ PC
i (S) ¸ 1 ¡ PC
i (T) = oC
i (T); (4.28)
which proves that property (4.11) holds, too.
The next theorem is the main result in this section.
Theorem 4.7.3 For each charge system C = fC1;:::;Cng on N the following
statements are equivalent:
i) C is a conservative charge system;
ii) C satis¯es the patch property;
iii) C satis¯es the obligation property.
Proof Equivalence of i), ii) and iii) follows from Theorems 4.4.1, 4.7.1 and
4.7.2. Speci¯cally, by Theorem 4.4.1, if C has the patch property then C is a
conservative charge system. By Theorem 4.7.2, if C is a conservative charge
system then C satis¯es the obligation property. Finally, by Theorem 4.7.1, if C
satis¯es the obligation property then C has the patch property. From
Theorem 4.7.3 and Remark 4.7.1 we conclude that the class of conservative
CC-rules coincides with the class of Obligation rules.
Remark 4.7.2 As we already observed in Remark 4.5.4, since the P-value and
the P¿-values, with ¿ 2 §N, are Obligation rules, one can obtain the corre-
sponding charge systems using relation (4.25). It is easy to check, for example,
that the obligation map of Example 4.5.1, which de¯nes the P-value as in Sec-





In this chapter, we study some properties of Obligation rules in mcst situations
where the cardinality of the set of agents can vary in time, and also increasing
or decreasing of connection costs may occur. In Section 5.2, we show that
Obligation rules are cost monotonic and induce population monotonic allocation
schemes. Note that the concept of cost monotonicity de¯ned in Section 5.2 and
introduced in Tijs et al. (2006a) is stronger than the concept of cost monotonicity
introduced in Dutta and Kar (2004), because we simply impose that if some
connection costs go down, then no agents will pay more (as in the strong cost
monotonicity property used by Berga~ ntinos and Vidal-Puga (2004)).
The irreducible core (that we will call the Bird core) is central in Sections
5.3 and 5.4. There, we will give a new \tree free" way to introduce the Bird
core by constructing for each mcst-problem a related problem, where the weight
function is a non-Archimedean semimetric. Moreover, we introduce a related
concept of cost monotonicity for multisolutions in mcst situations which gener-
alizes the concept of cost monotonicity for mcst solutions introduced in Section
5.2. The relations between stable cost monotonic rules and the Bird core are
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also discussed in Section 5.4.
Section 5.2 is based on Tijs, Branzei, Moretti, Norde (2006a); sections 5.3
and 5.4 are based on Tijs, Moretti, Branzei, Norde (2006b).
5.2 Cost monotonicity for solutions and pmas
In this section we will discuss some nice monotonicity properties of the Obliga-
tion rules. First, we provide the de¯nition of cost monotonic solutions for mcst
situations.
De¯nition 5.2.1 A solution F : WN
0
! I RN is a cost monotonic solution if
for all mcst situations w; ^ w 2 WN
0
such that w(^ e) · ^ w(^ e) for one edge ^ e 2 EN0
and w(e) = ^ w(e) for each e 2 EN0 n f^ eg, it holds that F(w) · F( ^ w).
We prove in Theorem 5.2.2 that Obligation rules are cost monotonic; the main
step is the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.1 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0) and let w 2 WN
0
. Let
^ e 2 EN0 and let h > w(^ e) be such that there is no e 2 EN0 with w(^ e) < w(e) < h.
De¯ne ~ w 2 WN
0
by ~ w(e) := w(e) if e 2 EN0 n f^ eg and ~ w(^ e) = h. Then:
Á^ o( ~ w) ¸ Á^ o(w).
Proof Let Z := fe 2 EN0jw(e) = w(^ e)g be the set of edges that have the same
cost as ^ e. Let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Without loss of generality we
may assume that ¾¡1(^ e) = maxf¾¡1(e)je 2 Zg, i.e. ¾ ranks the edges of Z with
^ e last. By construction we also have ~ w 2 K¾ and hence
Á^ o( ~ w) = D¾;^ o ~ w¾ ¸ D¾;^ ow¾ = Á^ o(w);
where at the inequality we used the fact that ~ w¾ ¸ w¾ and the fact that the
matrix D¾;^ o is non-negative.
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Proof Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0) and let Á^ o be the Obligation rule
w.r.t ^ o. Let w; ^ w 2 WN
0
and ^ e 2 EN0 be as in De¯nition 5.2.1.
Let H := fh 2 I Rj there is an edge f 2 EN0 s.t. h = w(f) 2 (w(^ e); ^ w(^ e))g. If
H = ; then the statement follows directly from Lemma 5.2.1. If H 6= ; write
H = fh1;:::;hkg with h1 < ::: < hk.
Consider the sequence of precisely k+2 mcst situations w0;:::;wk+1 2 WN
0
such that w0 = w, wk+1 = ^ w and for each r 2 f1;:::;kg, wr(e) = w(e) for each
e 2 EN0 n f^ eg and wr(^ e) = hr.
Applying Lemma 5.2.1 for each r 2 f1;:::;kg, with wr¡1 in the role of w
and wr in the role of ~ w, it follows that
Á^ o( ^ w) = Á^ o(wk+1) ¸ Á^ o(wk) ¸ ::: ¸ Á^ o(w0) = Á^ o(w);
which ¯nally proves cost monotonicity of Obligation rules.
The following theorem shows that Obligation rules induce a pmas for the cor-
responding mcst games.
Before introducing the theorem, we need to introduce some further notations.
Let o be an obligation function and ^ o the corresponding obligation map. Let
S µ N, let oS denote the restriction of o to 2S n f;g and let ^ oS denote the





for every µ 2 £(S [ f0g).
Recall also that if w 2 WN
0
, then the Obligation rule Á^ oS w.r.t the obligation
map ^ oS and applied to wjS0, i.e. the restriction of the weight function w to
ES0 µ EN0 as de¯ned in Section 2.1, provides a vector in I RS according to
De¯nition 4.5.3 w.r.t. the set of nodes S0.
Theorem 5.2.3 Let ^ o be an obligation map on £(N0), let Á^ o be the Obligation
rule w.r.t ^ o, and let w 2 WN
0
. Then, the table [Á^ oS(wjS0)]S22Nnf;g is a pmas
for the mcst game (N;cw).74 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES





w(fi;jg) if i;j 2 S0
w(fi;jg) + ¸S otherwise
(5.1)
where ¸S = 1 + maxfw(fi;jg)ji;j 2 S0g.
Then, in < T 0; ^ w > each edge with at least one node not in S0 is more
expensive than in < T 0;wjT 0 >.
Further, let ¹ ¾ 2 §ET0 be such that ^ w 2 K¹ ¾ and let ¾S
0
2 §ES0 be such
that ¾S
0




Note that for each i 2 S
Á
^ oT
i ( ^ w) = Á
^ oS
i (wjS0): (5.2)
This follows from the fact that in < S0;wjS0 > the edges with at least one node
not in S0 are discarded and in < T 0; ^ w > the edges with at least one node not
in S0 are allowed but they are too expensive. The result is that applying the
Kruskal procedure on < T 0; ^ w > w.r.t. ¹ ¾ the players in S0 are already connected
to 0 before one of the edges with nodes not in S0 is considered. So, by de¯nition
of an obligation map, we have that the contribution matrix D¹ ¾;^ oT with jTj rows
and jET 0j columns is of the form











99K players in S
99K players in T n S;
where the four submatrices D¾
S0
;^ oS;N1;N2 and R are such that:
² D¾
S0
;^ oS is the contribution matrix w.r.t. to ¾S
0
and to ^ oS with jSj rows
and jES0j columns;
² N1 is the null matrix with jSj rows and jET 0j ¡ jES0j columns;
² N2 is the null matrix with jTj ¡ jSj rows and jES0j columns;
² R is a real valued matrix with jTj ¡ jSj rows and jET 0j ¡ jES0j columns
obtained according to the de¯nition of the contribution matrix D¹ ¾;^ oT.5.3. MINIMAL MCST SITUATIONS 75
Hence, for each i 2 S, Á
^ oT
i ( ^ w) = (D¾
S0
;^ oS ^ w¾
S0
jS0 )i = Á
^ oS
i ( ^ wjS0) = Á
^ oS
i (wjS0), which
yields equation (5:2). [Here (D¾
S0
;^ oS ^ w¾
S
jS0)i is the i-th component of the vector
D¾
S0
;^ oS ^ w¾
S0
jS0 .]
Recall that Obligation rules are cost monotonic. Since ^ w(e) ¸ wjT 0(e) for each
e 2 ET 0, we have
Á
^ oT
i ( ^ w) ¸ Á
^ oT
i (wjT 0); for each i 2 T: (5.3)
From (5.2) and (5.3) we obtain
Á
^ oS
i (wjS0) ¸ Á
^ oT
i (wjT 0) for each i 2 S: (5.4)
From (5.4) and the e±ciency property it follows that [Á^ oS(wjS0)]S22Nnf;g is a
pmas for the mcst game (N;cw).
From Theorem 5.2.3 and the de¯nition of a pmas, it follows that Obligation
rules provide cost allocations which are core elements of the game (N;cw).
5.3 Minimal mcst situations
Let w 2 WN
0
. For each path p = (i0;i1;:::;ik) from i to j in the graph
< N0;EN0 > we denote the set of its edges by E(p), that is E(p) = ffi0;i1g;
fi1;i2g;:::;fik¡1;ikgg. Moreover, we call maxe2E(p) w(e) the top of the path
p and denote it by t(p). We denote by PN
0
ij the set of all paths without cycles
from i to j in the graph < N0;EN0 >.
Now, we de¯ne the key concept of this section, namely the reduced weight
function.
De¯nition 5.3.1 Let w 2 WN
0










for each i;j 2 N0, i 6= j.
Now, extending w by putting w(i;i) = 0 for each i 2 N0, we obtain a non-
negative function on the set of all pairs of elements in N0. The obtained reduced76 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES
weight function w is a semimetric on N0 with the sharp triangle inequality, i.e. a
non-Archimedean (NA-)semimetric. In formula, for each i;j;k 2 N0
w(i;j) ¸ 0 and w(i;i) = 0 (non-negativity);
w(i;j) = w(j;i) (symmetry);
w(i;k) · maxfw(i;j);w(j;k)g (sharp triangle inequality):
The proof is left to the reader. If w > 0, then w is a non-Archimedean metric
on the set N0.
For the reduced weight function w we have a special property related to
triangles, as the next lemma shows.
Proposition 5.3.1 (The isoscele triangle property) Let w be the reduced
weight function corresponding to w 2 WN
0
and i;j;k 2 N0 such that w(i;j) ·
w(i;k) and w(i;j) · w(k;j). Then, w(i;k) = w(j;k).
Proof By the sharp triangle inequality w(i;k) · maxfw(i;j);w(j;k)g = w(j;k)
and w(j;k) · maxfw(j;i);w(i;k)g = w(i;k).
So, w(i;k) = w(j;k).
This property for NA-semimetrics will be useful in proving that there are many
minimum cost spanning trees for (N0;w), as we will see in Theorem 5.3.2.
In the sequel we simply refer to w as the mcst situation which assigns to each
edge fi;jg 2 EN0 the reduced weight value as de¯ned in equality (5.5). Further,





the set of all mcst situations which assign to
each edge fi;jg 2 EN0 the distance w(i;j) provided by a reduced weight w on
N0.
Example 5.3.1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 5.1. Note that w 2 K¾, with ¾(1) = f1;2g;
¾(2) = f0;1g; ¾(3) = f1;3g; ¾(4) = f0;3g; ¾(5) = f0;2g; ¾(6) = f2;3g.
The corresponding mcst situation w is depicted in Figure 5.2.
One main result in this section, Proposition 5.3.2, concerns an interesting re-






























































Figure 5.2: The mcst situation w corresponding to w.
mcst situation w¡ as de¯ned by Bird (1976), where ¡ is an mcst for N0 in w.
Given an mcst situation w 2 WN
0
and an mcst ¡ for N0 in w, the minimal mcst









ij is the unique path in ¡ from i to j.
Proposition 5.3.2 Let w 2 WN
0
and i;j 2 N0. Let ¡ be an mcst for N0 in w
and p¡






Proof Let p¤ 2 argminp2PN0
ij t(p) and let e¤ be an edge on p¤ such that
t(p¤) = w(e¤). Let ^ e = fm;ng be an edge on p¡
ij with w(^ e) = t(p¡
ij).
We have to prove that w(^ e) = w(e¤). If so, then it follows immediately that
minp2PN0
ij t(p) = w(e¤) = w(^ e) = t(p¡
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If e¤ = ^ e then of course w(e¤) = w(^ e). Otherwise, ¯rst note that by de¯ni-
tion of e¤
w(^ e) ¸ w(e¤): (5.8)
Let Sm be the set of all nodes r 2 N0 such that n is not on the path from
m to r in < N0;¡ >; let Sn be the set of nodes r 2 N0 such that m is not on
the path from n to r in < N0;¡ >, i.e.
Sm = fr 2 N0j@e 2 E(p¡
mr) with n 2 eg
and
Sn = fr 2 N0j@e 2 E(p¡
nr) with m 2 eg:
Note that fSn;Smg is a partition of N0 and nodes in Sn are connected in
< N0;¡ > to nodes in Sm via edge fm;ng. Moreover, by the de¯nition of a
path without cycles, i;j must belong to di®erent sets of the partition fSn;Smg.
So, without loss of generality we suppose that i 2 Sm and j 2 Sn.
Consider the set of edges E+ = fft;vgjt 2 Sm;v 2 Sng. Then,
w(fm;ng) = w(^ e) · w(e); for each e 2 E+: (5.9)
In order to prove inequality (5.9), suppose on the contrary that w(fm;ng) >
w(e) for some e 2 E+. Then, the graph ¡+ = (¡ n f^ eg) [ feg would be a
spanning network in N0 cheaper than ¡, which yields a contradiction.
By the de¯nition of a path, for each p 2 PN
0
ij there exists at least one
edge e 2 E+ such that e is on the path p. By inequality (5.9), it follows that
t(p) ¸ w(e) ¸ w(^ e). This implies that w(e¤) = minp2PN0
ij t(p) ¸ w(^ e). To-
gether with inequality (5.8) we have ¯nally w(e¤) = w(^ e).
As a direct consequence of Proposition 5.3.2 we have that the mcst situation w
coincides, for each mcst ¡ for w, with the minimal mcst situation w¡ introduced
by Bird (1976). So, w¡ = w
· ¡ for each pair of mcst ¡; · ¡, a fact which is already
known (cf. Aarts (1994), Feltkamp (1995), Feltkamp et al. (1994)), but with
a complicated proof. Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¡ be an mcst for w. Let ¿ 2 §N.
We say that ¡ and ¿ ¯t (or, also, that ¿ ¯ts with ¡) if E¡
[¿(1)]0, E¡
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E¡
[¿(jNj)]0 are spanning networks on sets of nodes [¿(1)]0, [¿(2)]0;:::; [¿(jNj)]0,
respectively.
Example 5.3.2 In Figure 5.3 is depicted an mcst, denoted by ¡, for the mcst













Figure 5.3: An mcst ¡ for the mcst situation w of Figure 5.2.
¿1(3) = 3 and ¿2(1) = 1; ¿2(2) = 3; ¿2(3) = 2. Note that both ¿1 and ¿2 ¯t with
¡ but none of the other four elements of §N ¯ts with ¡.
Remark 5.3.1 Let w 2 WN
0
, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be an




w(e) = cw([¿(r)]) (5.10)
for each r 2 f1;:::;jNjg. So, E¡
[¿(r)]0 is an mcst for the mcst situation < [¿(r)]0;
wj[¿(r)]0 >.
Remark 5.3.2 Let w 2 WN
0
, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be an
order such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t. The marginal vector m¿(cw) of the mcst game
cw coincides with the Bird allocation in w corresponding to ¡ and therefore
m¿(cw) 2 C(cw), as is proved in Granot and Huberman (1981).
Remark 5.3.3 For each ¾ 2 §EN0 there exists a tree ¡ which is an mcst for
every w 2 K¾; further, there exists a ¿ 2 §N such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t.80 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES
The considerations in Remarks 5.3.1-5.3.3 together with the next lemma prelude
to Theorem 5.3.2.
Lemma 5.3.1 Let w 2 W
N
0
, let ¡ be an mcst for w and let ¿ 2 §N be such that
¡ and ¿ ¯t. Let r 2 f1;:::;jNj¡1g and let · ¿ 2 §N be such that · ¿(r) = ¿(r + 1),
· ¿(r + 1) = ¿(r) and · ¿(i) = ¿(i) for each i 2 f1;:::;jNjg n fr;r + 1g (i.e. · ¿ is
obtained from ¿ by a neighbor switch of ¿(r) and ¿(r + 1)). Then, there is an
mcst · ¡ for w such that · ¿ and · ¡ ¯t.
Proof If ¿(r) is not the immediate predecessor of ¿(r+1) in ¡ then take · ¡ = ¡
and then · ¿ and · ¡ ¯t.
If ¿(r) is the immediate predecessor of ¿(r + 1) in ¡, then let k 2 [¿(r ¡ 1)]0 be
the immediate predecessor of ¿(r) in ¡.
First, note that
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) ¸ w(fk;¿(r)g) (5.11)
and
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) ¸ w(f¿(r);¿(r + 1)g) (5.12)
because ¡ is an mcst for w.
Consider two cases:
c.1) w(fk;¿(r)g) · w(f¿(r);¿(r + 1)g). Take · ¡ = (¡ n ff¿(r);¿(r + 1)gg) [
ffk;¿(r + 1)gg. By inequality (5.11) and the isoscele triangle property
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) = w(f¿(r);¿(r + 1)g), and then · ¡ is an mcst in w and · ¡
and · ¿ ¯t.
c.2) w(f¿(r);¿(r+1)g) < w(fk;¿(r)g). Take · ¡ = (¡nffk;¿(r)gg)[ffk;¿(r+
1)gg. By inequality (5.12) and the isoscele triangle property w(fk;¿(r)g) =
w(fk;¿(r + 1)g) and then · ¡ is an mcst in w and · ¡ and · ¿ ¯t.




i) for each ¿ 2 §N there exists an mcst ¡ such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t.5.3. MINIMAL MCST SITUATIONS 81
ii) Let cw be the mcst game corresponding to w. Then, m¿(cw) 2 C(cw) for
all ¿ 2 §N and cw is a concave game.
Proof
i) Let ^ ¡ be an mcst for w. Then, there is at least one ^ ¿ 2 §N such that ^ ¡
and ^ ¿ ¯t. Further, each ¿ can be obtained from ^ ¿ by a suitable sequence
of neighbor switches and so, by applying Lemma 5.3.1 repeatedly, we
complete the proof of assertion i).
ii) Let ¡ be an mcst in N0 for w and let ¿ 2 §N be such that ¡ and ¿ ¯t. By
Remark 5:3:2, it follows that m¿(cw) coincides with the Bird allocation
corresponding to ¡. Hence, again by Remark 5:3:2, m¿(cw) 2 C(cw).
Finally, by the Ichiishi theorem (Ichiishi (1981)) telling that a game is
concave i® all marginal vectors are in the core of the game, it follows that
cw is a concave game.
Let w 2 WN
0
. We call the core of the mcst game cw the Bird core of the
mcst game cw and denote it by BC(w). By Theorem 5.3.2 it directly follows
that the Bird core BC(w) of the mcst game cw is the convex hull of all the
Bird allocations corresponding to the minimum cost spanning trees for w. Note
also that BC(w) µ C(cw), since cw(S) · cw(S) for each S 2 2N n f;g and
cw(N) = cw(N) (cf. Feltkamp (1995)).
Example 5.3.3 Consider the mcst situation w of Figure 5.1 and the corre-
sponding reduced mcst situation w of Figure 5.2. Then,
f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g f1;2;3g
cw 8 12 12 13 18 24 23
cw 8 8 10 13 18 18 23
There are six minimum cost spanning trees for w. Three of them lead to the
Bird allocation (8;5;10) and the other three to the Bird allocation (5;8;10).
Further, m¿(cw) = (8;5;10) for ¿ 2 §N with (¿(1);¿(2);¿(3)) 2 f(1;2;3);
(1;3;2);(3;1;2)g and m¿(cw) = (5;8;10) for ¿ 2 §N with (¿(1);¿(2);¿(3)) 282 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES
f(2;1;3); (2;3;1);(3;2;1)g. The Bird core BC(w) is the convex hull of the
marginal vectors of the game cw, that is BC(w) = convf(8;5;10); (5;8;10)g ½
C(cw).
5.4 Cost monotonicity for multisolutions
In Section 5.2 we have proved that the class of Obligation rules is a class of
solutions for mcst situations which are cost monotonic, i.e. if the costs of some
edges increase, then no agent will pay less.
In this section we introduce a related concept of cost monotonicity for mul-
tisolutions on mcst situations. We call a correspondence G : WN
0
³ I RN
assigning to every mcst situation w a set of cost allocations in I RN a multi-
solution. For instance, by Theorem 4.7.3, non-conservative CC-rules are not
solutions for mcst situations, but they are multisolutions.
De¯nition 5.4.1 A multisolution M : WN
0
³ I RN is a cost monotonic multi-
solution if for all mcst situations w;w0 2 WN
0
such that w(e) · w0(e) for each
e 2 EN0, it holds that
M(w) µ compr¡(M(w0)) and M(w0) µ compr+(M(w));
where compr¡(B) = fx 2 I RNj9b 2 B s.t. xi · bi 8i 2 Ng and compr+(B) =
fx 2 I RNj9b 2 B s.t. bi · xi 8i 2 Ng, for each B ½ I RN.
Cost monotonicity for multi-solutions is not satis¯ed in general by non-conservative
CC-rules, as it is shown in Example 5.4.1, dealing with speci¯c mcst situations
where the optimal tree is unique.
Example 5.4.1 Consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2;3g
and w as depicted in Figure 5.4 (left side). Note that there exists a unique
¾ 2 §N0 with w 2 K¾, where ¾ is such that ¾(1) = f1;2g, ¾(2) = f1;3g,





























































Figure 5.4: Two mcst situations w (left side) and w0 (right side).
4.4.1 to the charge systems ~ C introduced in Example 4.2.2 to calculate the
allocations provided by the corresponding CC-rules on < N0;w >. We have
Â
~ C;¾(w)
= 12 ¤ (1
2; 1
2;0)t + 16 ¤ (1
4; 1
4; 1





Now, consider the mcst situation < N0;w0 > with w0 as depicted in Figure
5.4 (right side), where w0(e) = w(e) for all e 2 EN0 n f1;2g and w0(f1;2g) >
w(f1;2g). Note that also for this mcst situation there exists a unique ¾0 2 §N0
with w0 2 K¾, where ¾0 is such that ¾0(1) = f1;3g, ¾0(2) = f1;2g, ¾0(3) =





= 16 ¤ (1
2;0; 1
2)t + 18 ¤ (1
4; 1
2; 1









is not a subset of compr+(fÂ
~ C;¾(w)g).
Before discussing properties of the Bird core as multisolution for mcst situations,
we introduce the following propositions dealing with mcst situations originated
from NA-semimetrics.84 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES
Proposition 5.4.1 Let w 2 W
N
0
, let ¡ be an mcst for w and ¿ 2 §N be such




for each j 2 f2;:::;jNjg.
Proof Let j 2 f2;:::;jNjg. Note that by Remark 5.3.1
m¿









Since ¡ and ¿ ¯t, we have E¡
[¿(j)]0 n E¡
(¿(j))0 = ff¿(j);sgg, for some s 2 (¿(j))0.
Because E¡











From (5.13) and (5.14) follows the proposition.
Proposition 5.4.2 Let w;w0 2 W
N
0
be NA-semimetric mcst situations such
that w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0. Then, it holds that
m¿(cw) · m¿(cw0) for each ¿ 2 §N:
Proof Let ¿ 2 §N. By Theorem 5.3.2 there exist two mcst's ¡ and ¡0 for w
and w0, respectively, such that they both ¯t with ¿. First, note that
m¿








for each j 2 f2;:::;jNjg, where the ¯rst and the second equality follow by
Proposition 5.4.1 and the inequality follows from w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0.5.4. COST MONOTONICITY FOR MULTISOLUTIONS 85
Theorem 5.4.1 The correspondence BC is a cost monotonic multisolution.
Proof Let w;w0 2 WN
0
be such that w(e) · w0(e) for each e 2 EN0. By
Theorem 5.3.2 and properties of concave games, BC(w) is a convex set whose
extreme points are the marginal vectors of the game cw, i.e. each element of
BC(w) is a convex combination of marginal vectors of the game cw. Let x 2
BC(w). There exist numbers ®¿; with ¿ 2 §N; 0 · ®¿ · 1,
P












= x0 2 BC(w0);
(5.16)
where the inequality follows by Proposition 5.4.2 and the fact that w(e) · w0(e)
for each e 2 EN0 and the second equality by Theorem 5.3.2, implying that
BC(w) µ compr¡(BC(w0)). Using a similar argument the other way around in
relations (5.16), it follows that BC(w0) µ compr+(BC(w)), which concludes the
proof.
To connect the cost monotonicity of the Bird core with cost monotonicity of
Obligation rules, we need Proposition 5.4.3.
Proposition 5.4.3 Let F : WN
0
! I RN be a cost monotonic and e±cient
solution. Then,
i) F(w) = F(w) for every w 2 WN
0
;
ii) If F is also stable (i.e. F(w0) 2 C(cw0) for every w0 2 WN
0
), then F(w) 2
BC(w) for every w 2 WN
0
.
Proof Let w 2 WN
0
. First, note that by De¯nition 5.3.1,
w(e) · w(e) for each e 2 EN0: (5.17)86 CHAPTER 5. MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES FOR COST ALLOCATION RULES
Let ¡ be an mcst for w.
i) By inequality (5.17) and cost monotonicity of F, F(w) · F(w). On the







So, F(w) = F(w).
ii) By inequality (5.17),
cw(S) · cw(S) for all S µ N;
and by De¯nition 5.3.1
cw(N) = cw(N) = w(¡):
Then, by stability of F, F(w) 2 C(cw) = BC(w) µ C(cw) and by result (i)
F(w) 2 BC(w) too.
Remark 5.4.1 Proposition 5.4.3 can be extended to multisolutions which are
cost monotonic and e±cient (Property 6.3.1 in Section 6.3) multisolutions. From
this follows that BC is the \largest" cost monotonic stable multisolution.
Remark 5.4.2 In Section 5.2 we have proved that Obligation rules are both
cost monotonic and stable solutions for mcst situations. So, by Proposition 5.4.3,
it follows that for each w 2 WN
0
, the set F(w) = fÁ(w) j Á is an Obligation ruleg





In Section 4.5 we have introduced the de¯nition of Obligation rules on Kruskal
cones and the related notion of contribution matrix w.r.t. an obligation map
^ o and an ordering ¾ 2 §EN0 of the edges. As a consequence, Obligation rules
are additive on each Kruskal cone in the space of mcst situations with a ¯xed
number of users, i.e. the allocation vector provided by an Obligation rule on
the mcst situation w + w0 is equal to the sum of allocation vectors provided by
the same Obligation rule on each single mcst situation w and w0, for each w;w0
in the Kruskal cone K¾. In this chapter, we show that the Cone-wise Positive
Linearity (CPL), de¯ned by Property 6.2.4 and reformulated for multi-solutions
by Property 6.3.4, is a fundamental property for the axiomatic characterizations
presented in this chapter. In fact, the CPL property is satis¯ed by every Oblig-
ation rule. In particular, the CPL property plays an important role for the
axiomatic characterization of a special Obligation rule, the P-value (Branzei et
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al. (2006b)). More surprisingly, the CPL property extended to multi-solutions
plays an important role also in the axiomatic characterization of the Bird core
(Tijs et al. (2006b)).
In Section 6.2 we give an axiomatic characterization of the P-value. An
axiomatic characterization of the Bird core is given in Section 6.3. Finally, in
Section 6.4 the additivity property of Obligation rules is used to characterize
these solutions for mcst situations using a value-theoretic approach based on
sharing values for cost games.
Section 6.2 is based on Branzei, Moretti, Norde, Tijs (2004); section 6.3 is
based on Tijs, Moretti, Branzei, Norde (2006b); section 6.4 is based on Moretti,
Tijs, Branzei, Norde (2005).
6.2 An axiomatic characterization of the P-value
Recall that a solution for mcst situations is a map F : WN
0
! I RN assigning
to every mcst situation w a unique cost allocation in I RN. Some interesting
properties for solutions of mcst situations are the following:





where ¡ is a minimum cost spanning network on N0.
Property 6.2.2 The solution F has the Equal Treatment (ET) property if for
each w 2 WN
0
and for each i;j 2 N with Ci(w) = Cj(w),
Fi(w) = Fj(w):
Property 6.2.3 The solution F has the upper bounded contribution (UBC)
property if for each w 2 WN
0
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Property 6.2.4 The solution F has the Cone-wise Positive Linearity (CPL)
property if for each ¾ 2 §EN0, for each pair of mcst situations w; b w 2 K¾ and
for each pair ®; b ® ¸ 0, we have
F(®w + b ®b w) = ®F(w) + b ®F(b w):
Proposition 6.2.1 The P-value satis¯es the properties EFF, ET, UBC and
CPL.
Proof Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Then, the
following considerations hold:
i) Let ¾(t1), ¾(t2);:::, ¾(tn), be the n edges of the mcst ¡ corresponding to
Kruskal order ¾. These edges correspond to non-zero columns in D¾;^ o
¤
and then the sum of coordinates of each column equals 1. Hence,
























which proves the EFF property.
ii) Note that if w is the zero function then it trivially follows that Pi(w) =
Pj(w) for each i;j 2 N.
Consider w 6= 0 and de¯ne k = minfjjw(¾(j)) > 0g. Then, w¾ is of the










i(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ^ o¤
i(¼¾;r))w(¾(r)): (6.1)
Let C be a (w;N0)-component and consider two users i;j 2 C. By Remark
4.6.1 this means that i and j are connected in the graph < N0;F ¾;k¡1 >
and so also in < N0;F¾;r > for every r 2 fk;:::;jEN0jg. Then, for each
r 2 fk;:::;jEN0jg
^ o¤
i(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ^ o¤
i(¼¾;r) = ^ o¤
j(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ^ o¤
j(¼¾;r):
Hence, by (6.1), Pi(w)=Pj(w), which proves the ET property.90 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
iii) If w is the zero function then it directly follows that
P
i2S Pi(w) = 0 =
mini2S w(fi;0g), for each S 2 2N n f;g.
Consider w 6= 0 and let C 6= f0g be a (w;N0)-component. Note that
there exists m 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg such that ¾(m) µ C [f0g and w(¾(m)) =
mini2Cnf0g w(fi;0g). De¯ne k = minfjjw(¾(j)) > 0g. If m < k, then
0 2 C and since nodes in Cnf0g pay nothing according to P(w), the UBC























where the ¯rst equality follows from ^ o¤
i(¼¾;u) = 0 for all u 2 fm;:::; jEN0jg
and for each i 2 C, and in the last one we use the fact that all nodes in
Cnf0g are connected in the graph < N0;F¾;k¡1 >. Note that (6.2) proves
the UBC property.
iv) The CPL property follows trivially from the de¯nition of P.
Theorem 6.2.1 The P-value is the unique solution which satis¯es the proper-
ties EFF, ET, UBC and CPL on the class WN
0
of mcst situations.
Proof We already know by Proposition 6.2.1 that the P-value satis¯es the four
properties EFF, ET, UBC and CPL. To prove the uniqueness consider a map
Ã : WN
0
! I RN satisfying EFF, ET, UBC and CPL.
Let ¾ 2 §EN0 and k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. First, we will show that for mcst










0 if 0 2 C
1 if 0 = 2 C









Ãj(e¾;k) · jC(e¾;k)j ¡ 1 = e¾;k(¡);
where ¡ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for mcst situation e¾;k. By EFF,
we have
P
i2N Ãi(e¾;k) = e¾;k(¡), and then the inequalities in equation (6.3)





0 if 0 2 Ci(e¾;k)
1
jCi(e¾;k)j if 0 = 2 Ci(e¾;k)
= ^ o¤
i(¼¾;k¡1) = Pi(e¾;k) (6.4)
for each i 2 N, where the last equality follows by relation (4.22). Note that we
only used EFF, ET and UBC properties to get relation (6.4) for mcst situation
e¾;k. Now, we use the CPL property to show that for any mcst situation w 2
WN
0
, Ã(w) = P(w). Let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. From the CPL
property of Ã and relation (2.2) it follows




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
Ã(e¾;k): (6.5)
Further, from (4.21), (6.4) and (6.5) we obtain Ã(w) = P(w).
To prove the logical independence of the four properties we need to consider
some other solutions on WN
0
:
i) z, such that zi(w) = 0 for each i 2 N and mcst situation w;
ii) P¿, with ¿ 2 §N;
iii) ², such that ²i(w) =
w(¡)
jNj for each i 2 N, where ¡ is a minimum spanning
network on N0 for mcst situation w;
iv) D, such that (w;N0)-components \pay" proportionally to their \distance"









C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g) w(¡) if 0 = 2 Ci(w)
0 if 0 2 Ci(w);
where ¡ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for mcst situation w.92 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
Proposition 6.2.2 The axioms EFF, ET, UBC and CPL are logically inde-
pendent.
Proof The logical independence of the four properties follows from the following
table.
EFF ET UBC CPL
z no yes yes yes
P¿ yes no yes yes
² yes yes no yes
D yes yes yes no
It is trivial to show that z satis¯es axioms ET, UBC and CPL but not EFF.
Being an Obligation rule, P¿ satis¯es the CPL, EFF and UBC, as it will be
proved in Proposition 6.2.3. In order to show that P¿ does not satisfy the ET
property, consider the mcst situation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2g and w as
depicted in Figure 6.1, and let ¿ 2 §f1;2g be such that ¿(1) = 1 and ¿(2) = 2.
Then, P¿
1 (w) = 0 and P¿













Figure 6.1: The mcst situation < f0;1;2g;w >.
To prove the third row, it is easy to see that ² satis¯es EFF, ET and CPL.
To see that ² does not satisfy the UBC property, consider again the mcst sit-
uation < N0;w > with N0 = f0;1;2g and w as depicted in Figure 6.1. Then,
²(w) = (3
2; 3
2), i.e. player 1 in the (w;N0)-component C = f1g pays more than
mini2Cnf0g w(fi;0g) = 1.
For the proof of the last row, note that D trivially satis¯es EFF and ET. Let
w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. The UBC property follows





C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g) ¸
¸
minj2C(w) w(fj;0g) P
C2C(w) minj2Cnf0g w(fj;0g)w(¡) =
P
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In order to prove that D does not satisfy the CPL property, consider the two
mcst situations < N0;w0 > and < N0;w00 >, with N0 = f0;1;2g and w0, w00 as



























Figure 6.2: Two mcst situations in the same Kruskal cone.
Note that w0;w00 2 K¾ with ¾(1) = f0;2g, ¾(2) = f1;2g and ¾(3) = f0;1g.
Then, D(w0) = (1
1 £ 4
4 £ 1;0) = (1;0) and D(w00) = (1
1 £ 20
21 £ 3; 1
1 £ 1




Di®erently, the sum of the two mcst situations w0 +w00 is the mcst situation













Figure 6.3: The mcst situation < f0;1;2g;w0 + w00 >.
(1
1 £ 24
25 £ 4; 1
1 £ 1




21) = D(w0) + D(w00).
We conclude this section with Proposition 6.2.3 claiming that every Obligation
rule satis¯es three of the four properties presented above.
Proposition 6.2.3 Obligation rules satisfy the properties EFF, UBC and CPL.94 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
Proof We already proved in Proposition 4.5.3 that Obligation rules are e±cient.
As we already observed, the CPL property follows trivially from the de¯ni-
tion of Obligation rule, since the contribution matrix w.r.t. an obligation map
^ o and an ordering ¾ 2 §EN0 is the same for each w 2 K¾.
The same arguments used to prove that the P-value satis¯es the UBC prop-
erty works also for every Obligation rule. More precisely, let ^ o be an obligation
map on £(N0), let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾.




i(w) = 0 = mini2S w(fi;0g), for each S 2 2N n f;g.
Consider w 6= 0 and let C 6= f0g be a (w;N0)-component. Note that
there exists an m 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg such that ¾(m) µ C [ f0g and w(¾(m)) =
mini2Cnf0g w(fi;0g). De¯ne k = minfjjw(¾(j)) > 0g. If m < k, then 0 2 C
since nodes in C n f0g pay nothing according to Á^ o(w) and the UBC property













r=k(^ oi(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ^ oi(¼¾;r)) =
= w(¾(m))
P
i2Cnf0g ^ oi(¼¾;k¡1) =
= w(¾(m))
(6.6)
where in the ¯rst equality we use that ^ oi(¼¾;u) = 0 for all u 2 fm;:::;jEN0jg
and for each i 2 C, and in the last one we use the fact that all nodes in C nf0g
are connected in the graph < N0;F¾;k¡1 >. Note that relation (6.6) proves the
UBC property.
6.3 An axiomatic characterization of the Bird
core
In order to introduce an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core, we need
to prove the following fact for NA-semimetric mcst situations.6.3. AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BIRD CORE 95
Lemma 6.3.1 Let w;w0 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w;w0 2 K¾.
Let ®;®0 ¸ 0. Then, ®w;®0w0;®w + ®0w0 2 K^ ¾ for some ^ ¾ 2 §EN0.
Proof By relation (5.5), for each edge e 2 EN0, there is an edge ¹ e 2 EN0 such
that w(e) = w(¹ e): given that e = fi;jg, ¹ e is such that w(¹ e) = minP2PN0
ij t(p).
Note that for each w1 in the same cone K¾ as w we have w1(e) = w1(¹ e). This
implies that for all pairs of edges e1;e2 2 EN0
w(e1) · w(e2) , w(¹ e1) · w(¹ e2) , w1(e1) · w1(e2):
So, for each ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0 we have:
w 2 K¹ ¾ , w1 2 K¹ ¾:
Using this fact, respectively, for ®w; ®0w0 and ®w + ®0w0 2 K¾ in the role
of w1, we obtain
w 2 K¹ ¾ , ®w;®0w0;®w + ®0w0 2 K¹ ¾;
for each ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0.
Proposition 6.3.1 Let w;w0 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w;w0 2 K¾.
Let ®;®0 ¸ 0. Then,
i) ®w + ®0w0 = ®w + ®0w0;
ii) c®w+®0w0 = ®cw + ®0cw0.
[The NA-semimetric mcst situations w;w0;®w + ®0w0 are obtained via reduction
of the weight functions w;w0;®w + ®0w0, respectively.]
Proof
i) Let e = fi;jg 2 EN0. We have
®w + ®0w0(e) = (®w + ®0w0)(^ e)
= ®w(^ e) + ®0w0(^ e)
= ®w(e) + ®0w0(e);96 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS






and where the second equality follows from the fact that w;w0 and (®w+
®0w0) all belong to K¾;
ii) Note that, by Lemma 6.3.1, ®w;®0w0;®w + ®0w0 2 K¹ ¾ for some ¹ ¾ 2 §EN0.
For each S 2 2N n f;g, there is, according to Remark 5.3.3, a common
mcst ¡S for ®w;®0w0 and ®w + ®0w0. Hence,


















where the third equality follows by (i).
Some interesting properties for multisolutions on the class of mcst situations
are the following.
Property 6.3.1 The multisolution G is e±cientF (EFFF) if for each w 2 WN
0




where ¡ is a minimum cost spanning network for w on N0.
Property 6.3.2 The multisolution G has the positive (POS) property if for
each w 2 WN
0
and for each x 2 G(w)
xi ¸ 0
for each i 2 N.
Property 6.3.3 The multisolution G has the Upper Bounded ContributionF
(UBCF) property if for each w 2 WN
0






for each x 2 G(w).6.3. AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BIRD CORE 97
Property 6.3.4 The multisolution G has the Cone-wise Positive LinearityF
(CPLF) property if for each ¾ 2 §EN0, for each pair of mcst situations w; b w 2
K¾ and for each pair ®; b ® ¸ 0, we have
G(®w + b ®b w) = ®G(w) + b ®G(b w):
[Here we denote by ®G(w) + b ®G(b w) the set f®x + b ®b xjx 2 G(w); b x 2 G(b wg.]
Proposition 6.3.2 The Bird core BC satis¯es the properties EFFF, POS, UBCF
and CPLF.
Proof Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Since BC(w) =
C(cw), the following considerations hold:
i) For each allocation x 2 BC(w),
P
i2N xi = w(¡) for some mcst ¡ for w by
the e±ciency property of the core of the game cw. So, BC has the EFFF
property.
ii) For each allocation x 2 BC(w), xi ¸ 0 for each i 2 N since the Bird core
is the convex hull of all Bird allocations in the mcst w, which are vectors
in I RN
+. So, BC has the POS property.
iii) For each (w;N0)-component C 6= f0g and each x 2 BC(w)
X
i2Cnf0g
xi · cw(C n f0g) = min
i2Cnf0g
w(fi;0g)
by coalitional rationality of the core of the game cw. So, BC has the UBCF
property.
iv) Let ¾ 2 §EN0, let w;w0 2 WN
0
be such that w;w0 2 K¾ and let ®;®0 ¸ 0.
Since the core is additive on the class of concave games (see Dragan et
al. (1989)), we have
BC(®w+®0w0) = C(c®w+®0w0) = ®C(cw)+®0C(cw0) = ®BC(w)+®0BC(w0):
Hence, BC has the CPLF property.
Inspired by the axiomatic characterization of the P-value (Branzei et al. (2004))
we provide the following theorem.98 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
Theorem 6.3.2 The Bird core BC is the largest multisolution which satis¯es
EFFF, POS, UBCF and CPLF, i.e. for each multisolution F which satis¯es
EFFF, POS, UBCF and CPLF, we have F(w) µ BC(w), for each w 2 WN
0
.
Proof We already know by Proposition 6.3.2 that the Bird core BC satis¯es
the four properties EFFF, POS, UBCF and CPLF.
Let ª : WN
0
³ I RN be a multisolution satisfying EFFF, POS, UBCF and
CPLF. Let w 2 WN
0
and ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. We have to prove
that ª(w) µ BC(w).











Let x 2 ª(w). According to (6.7) there exists xe
¾;k













By the UBCF property, for each k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg and for each (e¾;k;N0)-











0 if 0 2 C














j · jC(e¾;k)j ¡ 1 = e¾;k(¡);
where ¡ is a minimum spanning network on N0 for the simple mcst situation e¾;k.




i = e¾;k(¡), and then inequalities in









0 if 0 2 C
1 if 0 = 2 C:
(6.9)6.4. SHARING VALUES FOR MCST GAMES 99
Now, consider the game ce¾;k corresponding to the simple mcst situation e¾;k.
Note that for each S 2 2N n f;g,
ce¾;k(S) =
¯ ¯
¯fC j C is a (e¾;k;N0) ¡ component;C \ S 6= ;;0 = 2 Cg
¯ ¯
¯;
which is the number of (e¾;k;N0)-components not connected to 0 in e¾;k with
at least one node in the player set S.




i · ce¾;k(S) and to-
gether with the EFFF property we have xe
¾;k
2 C(ce¾;k) = BC(e¾;k). Moreover,













2 C(cw) = BC(w):
(6.10)
Keeping into account relation (6.7), we have ª(w) µ BC(w).
6.4 Sharing values for mcst games
In this section the set of Obligation rules, and, consequently, the set of conser-
vative CC-rules, will be considered from a value-theoretic point of view.
First, we introduce some notions. The dual unanimity game (N;u¤
S) on S µ
N is the game described by u¤
S(T) = 1 if S \ T 6= ; and u¤
S(T) = 0, otherwise.
It is well-known that the dual unanimity games form a basis of the linear space
GN implying that every cost game (N;c) can be written as a linear combination




coe±cients (®S(c))S22Nnf;g are called dual unanimity coe±cients of the cost
game (N;c).
A sharing system is a map q : 2N n f;g ! I RN
+ such that q(S) 2 ¢(S) , for
every nonempty coalition S. With every sharing system q one can associate a







where ®S(c) is the dual unanimity coe±cient of S in the game c.100 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
The most well-known value in the theory of cost games is the Shapley value,
introduced by Shapley (1953). This value can be described in several ways. In








for each i 2 N. Note that relation (6.12) can be obtained by relation (6.11)
with qi(S) = 1
jSj, for each i 2 N and S µ N such that i 2 S.
Further, with every obligation function o one can associate a special sharing
value mo.
The following lemmas are helpful in relating sharing values with Obligation
rules.
Lemma 6.4.1 Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Then,




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
e¾;k,




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
ce¾;k,
where e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg, is the the minimal mcst situation on
e¾;k 2 K¾.
Proof The proof follows from relation (2.2) and by Proposition 6.3.1.
Let o be an obligation function and let ^ o be the corresponding obligation map
on £(N0). Let w 2 WN
0
. From relation (2.2) and the de¯nition of Obligation
rule via relation (4.14), it follows that Á^ o(w) can be calculated as linear com-
bination of Á^ o(e¾;k), k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. More precisely, let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such
that w 2 K¾, then




w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
Á^ o(e¾;k); (6.13)





^ o(¼¾;r¡1) ¡ ^ o(¼¾;r)
¢
= ^ o(¼¾;k) =
P
V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V o(V ):
(6.14)6.4. SHARING VALUES FOR MCST GAMES 101
Further, from Proposition 4.5.3 (e±ciency of Obligation rules), Theorems 5.2.2
(cost monotonicity of Obligation rules) and Proposition 5.4.3.i it follows that
for every w 2 WN
0
Á^ o(w) = Á^ o(w): (6.15)
Now, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4.2 Let ¾ 2 §EN0 and let e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;:::;jEN0jg. Let ^ o be
an obligation map on £(N0). Then,
i) ce¾;k =
P
V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V u¤
V ,
ii) mo(ce¾;k) = Á^ o(e¾;k),
where e¾;k 2 K¾, k 2 f1;2;:::;jEN0jg, is the the minimal mcst situation on
e¾;k 2 K¾.
Proof First, note that by Lemma 6.3.1, e¾;k 2 K¾.
i) follows from the fact that for each S 2 2N n f;g,
ce¾;k(S) = jfV : V is a (e¾;k;N0) ¡ component;V \ S 6= ;;0 = 2 V gj;













V 2¼¾;k:0= 2V o(V ) = Á^ o(e¾;k);
(6.16)
where the ¯rst equality follows by part i) of Proof, the second equality
follows from linearity of mo, the third equality follows from relation (6.11)
and the last equality follows from relations (6.14) and (6.15).
Finally, we introduce the main result of this section.102 CHAPTER 6. ADDITIVITY-BASED CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR COST ALLOCATION PROTOCOLS
Theorem 6.4.3 Let w 2 WN
0
and let ¾ 2 §EN0 be such that w 2 K¾. Let ^ o
be an obligation map on £(N0). Then,







w(¾(k)) ¡ w(¾(k ¡ 1))
¢
mo(ce¾;k)








where the ¯rst equality follows from Lemma 6.4.1.ii and the linearity of mo,
the second equality from Lemma 6.4.2.ii, and the third equality follows from
relation (6.13).
Corollary 6.4.4 The P-value on w equals the Shapley value on cw.
Proof Consider the charge system of Example 4.2.3. As we already said in
Remark 4.7.2, such a charge system leads to a conservative CC-rule which cor-
responds to the P-value (Branzei et al. (2004)). The obligation function o¤
obtained from the charge system ^ C of Example 4.2.3 via relation (4.27) is such
that o¤(S) = e
S
jSj for each S 2 2N n f;g, where eS is the jNj-vector such that
eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and eS
i = 0 if i 2 N n S. Then, from relation (6.12) it follows
directly that mo
¤
(cw) is the Shapley value of the game cw.Chapter 7
Variants of mcst games
7.1 Introduction
In this section we consider some variants of minimum cost spanning tree games.
One variant, presented in Section 7.2, is the class of monotonic minimum cost
spanning tree games which are characterized by the fact that coalitions are
allowed to use networks which contain nodes outside the coalition (Steiner trees).
Two other variants are obtained by considering directed weighted graphs. Here
the aim of coalitions is to construct a directed network such that every player
in the coalition is connected with the source via a directed path. This approach
leads to the class of directed minimum cost spanning tree games and monotonic
directed minimum cost spanning tree games, both presented in Section 7.3. For
any of these new classes of games we present an example that does not have
a pmas. Finally, in Section 7.4, a special subclass of directed minimum cost
spanning tree problems, introduced in Moretti et al. (2002), is studied, which
shows up in considering the problem of connecting houses in mountains with
a water puri¯er. It is shown that the games corresponding to these problems
always have a pmas. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 are based on Section 6 in Norde,
Moretti, Tijs (2004) and Section 7.4 is based on Moretti, Norde, Pham Do, Tijs
(2002).
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7.2 Monotonic mcst games
First, we consider the class of monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games.
De¯nition 7.2.1 Let < N0;w > be a complete weighted graph. The monotonic
minimum cost spanning tree game (N;c
mon), corresponding to < N0;w >, is
de¯ned by
c
mon(S) = minfw(¡) : ¡ is a spanning network for some coalition T ¶ Sg
for every S 2 2Nnf;g.
In the following example we present a monotonic minimum cost spanning tree
game without a pmas.
Example 7.2.1 Consider the complete weighted graph < N0;w > with N0 =
f0;1;2;3;4;5;6g and cost function w as depicted in Figure 7.1. All edges which
are depicted have cost 1, whereas all other edges have cost 10. A minimum
H H H H H H H H
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Figure 7.1: The cost function of Example 7.2.1.
cost spanning tree for S = f1;2;3g is ff0;4g;f0;5g;f1;4g;f2;4g;f3;5gg. So,
c
mon(123) = 5. A minimum cost spanning tree for S = f1;2g is ff0;4g;f1;4g;
f2;4gg. So, c
mon(12) = 3. In a similar way one gets c
mon(13) = c
mon(23) = 3. If7.3. DIRECTED MCST GAMES 105
c
mon has a pmas fxS;igS22Nnf;g;i2S then
10 = 2c
mon(123)
= 2(x123;1 + x123;2 + x123;3)
· x12;1 + x13;1 + x12;2 + x23;2 + x13;3 + x23;3






which yields a contradiction. In fact, we have shown that c
mon is not even
totally balanced. Megiddo (1978) already noted that monotonic minimum cost
spanning tree games do not have to be totally balanced.
7.3 Directed mcst games
In order to provide the de¯nition of directed minimum cost spanning tree games
and monotonic directed minimum cost spanning tree games we need some more
terminology. A complete directed weighted graph is a tuple < N0;w > where
i) N0 = f0;1;:::;ng;
ii) w : D ! I R+, where D = f(i;j) : i;j 2 N0;i 6= jg.
Elements of D are called directed arcs. A directed path from i to j in network
¡ µ D is a sequence of nodes i = i0;i1;:::;ik = j such that (is;is+1) 2 ¡ for
every s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g. Network ¡ is a spanning network for S (S µ N) if for
every (i;j) 2 ¡ we have fi;jg µ S[f0g and if for every i 2 S there is a directed
path in ¡ from i to 0.
De¯nition 7.3.1 Let < N0;w > be a complete directed weighted graph. The
directed minimum cost spanning tree game (N;c), corresponding to < N0;w >,
is de¯ned by
c(S) = minfw(¡) : ¡ is a spanning network for Sg106 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
for every S 2 2Nnf;g, whereas the monotonic directed minimum cost spanning
tree game (N;c
mon), corresponding to < N0;w >, is de¯ned by
c
mon(S) = minfw(¡) : ¡ is a spanning network for some coalition T ¶ Sg
for every S 2 2Nnf;g.
We conclude this section with two examples which show that directed minimum
cost spanning tree games and monotonic directed minimum cost spanning tree
games do not necessarily have a pmas.
Example 7.3.1 Consider the complete directed weighted graph < N0;w >
with N0 = f0;1;2;3;4;5;6g and cost function w as depicted in Figure 7.2. All
directed arcs which are depicted have cost 0 whereas all other directed arcs
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Figure 7.2: The cost function of Example 7.3.1.
corresponding to < N0;w >, and suppose that x = fxS;igS22Nnf;g;i2S is a
pmas for c. A minimum cost spanning network for N is obtained by taking
all directed arcs with cost 0 and directed arc (1;0). So, c(123456) = 1. Now,
consider S = f1;3;4g. We have
2 = c(134) = x134;1 + x134;3 + x134;4
· x14;1 + x3;3 + x14;4
= x14;1 + x14;4 + x3;3
= c(14) + c(3)
= 1 + 1 = 2;
and hence x134;3 = x3;3 = c(3) = 1. Since also c(13) = c(4) = 1 we get in a
similar way that x134;4 = 1. Therefore, x134;1 = c(134) ¡ x134;3 ¡ x134;4 = 07.4. A CONNECTION SITUATION ON MOUNTAINS 107
and hence, by population monotonicity, xN;1 · x134;1 = 0. By considering
respectively coalitions f2;3;4g, f3;5;6g, f4;5;6g, f5;1;2g and f6;1;2g we get
via analogous arguments that the numbers xN;2;:::;xN;6 are all nonpositive.
This contradicts however that
P
i2N xN;i = c(N) = 1.
Example 7.3.2 Consider the complete directed weighted graph < N0;w >
with N0 = f0;1;2;3;4;5;6g and cost function w as depicted in Figure 7.3. All
directed arcs which are depicted have cost 0, whereas all other directed arcs
have cost 1. Let c
mon be the monotonic directed minimum cost spanning tree
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Figure 7.3: The cost function of Example 7.3.2.
game corresponding to < N0;w >. A minimum cost spanning network for
S = f1;2;3g is f(1;4);(2;4);(3;5);(4;0);(5;0)g so c
mon(123) = 2. A minimum
cost spanning network for S = f1;2g is f(1;4);(2;4);(4;0)g so c
mon(12) = 1. In
a similar way one gets c
mon(13) = c





mon(23) we conclude, in a similar way as in Example 7.2.1, that c
mon
has no pmas.
7.4 A connection situation on mountains
Consider a group of persons whose houses lie on mountains which surround a
valley or part of a coast. Their houses are not yet connected to a drainage where108 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
one has to empty their sewage. Obviously, sewage has to be collected downhill,
in a water puri¯er in the valley or along the coast. Each one wants to connect
his house with a drain pipe to the water puri¯er. However, it is possible but not
necessary for everyone to be connected directly with the water puri¯er, being
connected via others is su±cient. Assuming that pipes are large enough one
pipe can serve more than one person. Only connections from houses to strictly
lower ones are allowed but, sometimes, connection from higher houses to lower
houses is impossible (e.g. because of a natural reef between the two houses). A
formal description of this kind of situations on mountains is given below.
Consider a tuple given by < N;f0g;A;w >, where N = f1;2;:::;ng cor-
responds to the set of agents (houses), 0 corresponds to the water puri¯er and
where < N [ f0g;A > is a rooted directed graph with N [f0g as set of vertices,
A ½ N £ (N [ f0g) as set of arcs and 0 as the root. We assume also that the
following conditions M.1 and M.2 hold:
M.1 (Direct connection possibility) For each k 2 N, (k;0) 2 A.
M.2 (No cycles) For each s 2 I N and v1;v2;:::;vs 2 N [ f0g such that
(v1;v2) 2 A, (v2;v3) 2 A, :::, (vs¡1;vs) 2 A we have (vs;v1) = 2 A.
Further, w : A ! I R+ is a non-negative function on the set of arcs. We call such
a tuple < N;f0g;A;w > with the properties M.1 and M.2 a mountain situation.
Given a mountain situation < N;f0g;A;w > there exists an intrinsic height
function h : N [ f0g ! I N [ f0g such that (i;j) 2 A implies h(i) > h(j). One
de¯nes h as follows: for i 2 N [ f0g, h(i) is the length of a longest path from i
to 0.
To avoid too many technicalities we will assume in the following that <
N;f0g;A;w > does not only satisfy M.1 and M.2, but also M.3:
M.3 (Genericity condition) For each k 2 N and all i;j 2 N [ f0g;i 6= j:
(k;i) 2 A;(k;j) 2 A ) w(k;i) 6= w(k;j).
Condition M.3 gives us the possibility to speak of the cheapest connection point
bS(k) of k in S, with S 2 2N n f;g:
bS(k) = argminl2S[f0g:(k;l)2Aw(k;l):7.4. A CONNECTION SITUATION ON MOUNTAINS 109
Condition M.3 is useful to avoid too many technicalities. We invite the reader
to adjust the results of this section for situations where M.3 does not hold.
Two interesting questions related to such a mountain situation are:
Q.1 How to ¯nd a 0-connecting subtree < N [ f0g;T > of < N [ f0g;A >,
i.e. a subtree connecting each i 2 N with 0, with minimum cost?
Q.2 How to allocate the connection costs in such a tree among the agents?
Given a mountain situation < N;f0g;A;w >, the next theorem answers
question Q.1 showing that there is a unique optimal tree (with minimum cost),
connecting all players in N with the root 0. This tree corresponds to the situ-
ation where each agent k 2 N connects himself with his best connection point
bN(k) 2 N [ f0g.
Theorem 7.4.1 Let < N;f0g;A;w > be a mountain situation and let T =
f(k;bN(k))jk 2 Ng. Then
(i) < N [ f0g;T > is a 0-connecting subtree of < N [ f0g;A >.
(ii) The tree < N [f0g;T > is the unique 0-connecting subtree with minimum
cost.
Proof (i) Since T ½ A, clearly T does not contain cycles. That T is a tree
connecting each point i 2 N via a path with 0 follows from the claim that for
each s 2 f1;:::;Lg, where L = maxfh(i)ji 2 N [f0gg, the next property P(s)
holds:
P(s): for each k 2 N with h(k) = s there is a t(k) 2 I N and
a sequence v0;v1;:::;vt(k) such that v0 = k, vr+1 = bN(vr) for
r = 0;1;:::;t(k) ¡ 1, and vt(k) = 0.
We prove the claim by induction to s. P(1) holds because for each k 2 N with
h(k) = 1 we take t(k) = 1, v0 = k and v1 = 0. Suppose now that P(s) holds
for each s < m with m 2 f2;:::;Lg. Let k 2 N be such that h(k) = m. Then
h(bN(k)) < m. If h(bN(k)) = 0, then bN(k) = 0 and we take t(k) = 1, v0 = k,
v1 = 0. Suppose h(bN(k)) 6= 0. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a
t(bN(k)) and a sequence v0;v1;:::;vt(bN(k)) determining a path in A from bN(k)110 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
to 0 with vr+1 = bN(vr) for r 2 f0;1;:::;t(bN(k)) ¡ 1g. Then w0;w1;:::;wt(k)
is a desired path for k, where t(k) = t(bN(k)) + 1, w0 = k, wi = vi¡1 for
i 2 f1;:::;t(k)g. So, P(m) holds.
(ii) Let < N [ f0g;G > be a 0-connecting tree unequal to < N [ f0g;T >.
Then for each point k 2 N, there is a ¼(k) 2 N [ f0g such that (k;¼(k)) 2 G.
Moreover, since G 6= T we can choose ¼ : N ! N [ f0g such that there is a











So, < N [ f0g;G > is not optimal.
Example 7.4.1 Figure 7.4 corresponds to a mountain situation < N;f0g;A;
w >, where N = f1;2;3g, A = f(1;0);(2;0);(2;1);(3;0);(3;1);(3;2)g and
w(i;j) = 10i ¡ 5j for each (i;j) 2 A. Then the intrinsic height function h
is described by h(i) = i for each i 2 N. Since bN(1) = 0, bN(2) = 1, bN(3) = 2,
the tree < N[f0g;T > with T = f(1;0);(2;1);(3;2)g is an optimal 0-connecting

































Figure 7.4: The mountain situation of Example 7.4.1
7.4.1 Cooperative cost games on mountain situations
To provide an answer to question Q.2 we need to introduce the corresponding
cooperative cost games. For further use, we ¯rst recall bounds for core elements7.4. A CONNECTION SITUATION ON MOUNTAINS 111
for a cooperative cost game (N;c):
Mi(N;c) · xi · c(fig) for all x 2 core(N;c);i 2 N: (7.1)
Here Mi(N;c) = c(N)¡c(Nnfig), is the marginal contribution to the costs of N
by player i 2 N. Note that the second inequality in (7.1) is one of the stability
conditions
P
i2S xi · c(S), S 2 2N, of core allocations. For the ¯rst inequality







xk = c(N) ¡
X
k2Nnfig
xk ¸ c(N) ¡ c(Nnfig) = Mi(N;c);
where the second equality follows from the fact that core allocations are e±-
cient and the inequality from the stability condition
P
i2S xi · c(S) of core
allocations, with Nnfig in the role of S.
Let < N;f0g;A;w > be a mountain situation. Then the corresponding
cooperative cost game (N;^ c) is given by ^ c(;) = 0 and for T 2 2Nnf;g the cost
^ c(T) of coalition T is the cost of the optimal 0-connecting tree in the mountain
problem < T;f0g;A(T);wT >, where A(T) = f(i;j) 2 Aji 2 T;j 2 T [ f0gg,
and wT : A(T) ! I R+ is the restriction of w : A ! I R+ to A(T). Note that for





Take the allocation B(N;f0g;A;w) 2 I RN with Bk(N;f0g;A;w) = w(k;bN(k)),
corresponding to the situation where each player i pays his cheapest connection



















for each T 2 2Nnf;g. The core element B(N;f0g;A;w) corresponds to the
situation where the player bN(k) to which k connects himself does not ask a
compensation for this service to k. But there are other interesting core alloca-
tions in general, corresponding to situations where compensation plays a role.112 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
In the description of these core elements the second cheapest connection point
of k in T [ f0g,
sT(k) =
(
argminl2(T[f0g)nfbT(k)g:(k;l)2Aw(k;l) if bT(k) 6= 0
0 if bT(k) = 0;
plays a role.
Suppose player k wants to connect to bN(k) 6= 0 and player bN(k) wants to
ask a price pk ¸ 0 from k for connecting k. Which price pk can bN(k) ask for his
service to k such that k connects with bN(k) and does not go, e.g., to the second
best connection point sN(k) for a connection? The price should be an element
of the closed interval [0;w(k;sN(k)) ¡ w(k;bN(k))]. A price pk larger than
w(k;sN(k)) ¡ w(k;bN(k)) can lead to a connection to sN(k), and if sN(k) 6= 0
even to a positive compensation for sN(k), e.g. 1
2(pk¡w(k;sN(k))+w(k;bN(k)))
and then both players k and sN(k) are better o®. The allocations (x1;:::;xn)
corresponding to such competitive prices in the given closed interval turn out to
be just the core allocations of the k-connection game (N;ck) to be introduced
now.
The k-connection game (N;ck) is the cooperative cost game with ck(S) = 0
if k = 2 S and ck(S) = w(k;bS(k)) otherwise. Note that, if bN(k) 6= 0, then
MbN(k)(N;ck) = ck(N) ¡ ck(NnfbN(k)g) = w(k;bN(k)) ¡ w(k;sN(k)).
Theorem 7.4.2 Let (N;c1);:::;(N;cn) be the connection games corresponding





(ii) core(N;^ c) ¾ P(N;c) where P(N;c) =
Pn
k=1 core(N;ck),
(iii) for every T 2 2Nnf;g we have core(T;ck) = f0g if k = 2 T,
core(T;ck) =
fw(k;bT(k))ek ¡ (ebT(k) ¡ ek)pj0 · p · w(k;sT(k)) ¡ w(k;bT(k))g
if k 2 T;bT(k) 6= 0, and
core(T;ck) = fw(k;0)ekg if k 2 T;bT(k) = 0.7.4. A CONNECTION SITUATION ON MOUNTAINS 113
[Here ek 2 I RT is the k-th standard basis vector with k-th coordinate 1 and
the other coordinates 0.]
Proof (i) is a direct consequence of the de¯nitions of c;c1;:::;cn.
(ii) follows from (i) because core(N;¢) is a superadditive correspondence.
(iii) Note that if k = 2 T then (T;ck) is the zero game and hence core(T;ck)= f0g.
If k 2 T and bT(k) 6= 0 then Mi(T;ck) = ck(i) = 0 if i 2 Tnfk;bT(k)g. For
x 2 core(T;ck) we have, by (7.1), xi = 0 for each i 2 Tnfk;bT(k)g. Further,
since core allocations are e±cient, we have xk + xbT(k) = ck(T) = w(k;bT(k)),
and, by (7.1), w(k;bT(k)) ¡ w(k;sT(k)) = MbT(k)(T;ck) · xbT(k) · 0. This
implies that
core(T;ck) ½
fw(k;bT(k))ek ¡ (ebT(k) ¡ ek)pj0 · p · w(k;sT(k)) ¡ w(k;bT(k))g:
For the reverse inclusion, note that for xp = w(k;bT(k))ek ¡ (ebT(k) ¡ ek)p with




i = w(k;bT(k)) =
ck(T) and for S ½ T:
xp(S) = w(k;bT(k))
= ck(S) if fk;bT(k)g ½ S
xp(S) = 0
= ck(S) if fk;bT(k)g \ S = ;
xp(S) = w(k;bT(k)) + p
· w(k;sT(k))
· ck(S) if k 2 S;bT(k) = 2 S; and
xp(S) = ¡p
· 0
= ck(S) if k = 2 S;bT(k) 2 S:
So, xp 2 core(T;ck).
If k 2 T and bT(k) = 0 the statement can be proved in a similar way.
The subset P(N;^ c) of core(N;^ c) is the set of price supported core elements. In
the next section we will show that elements x of P(N;^ c) are pmas-extendable
i.e. there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme faT;igT22Nnf;g;i2T
such that aN;i = xi for each i 2 N.114 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
Example 7.4.2 Consider again the mountain situation of Example 7.4.1. The
cost game (N;^ c) corresponding to this situation and the k-connection games are
given in the next table:
S = (1) (2) (3) (1;2) (1;3) (2;3) (1;2;3)
c(S) = 10 20 30 25 35 40 45
c1(S) = 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
c2(S) = 0 20 0 15 0 20 15
c3(S) = 0 0 30 0 25 20 20
Note that c = c1+c2+c3, core(N;c1) = f(10;0;0)g, core(N;c2) = convf(0;15;0);
(¡5;20;0)g, and core(N;c3) = convf(0;0;20);(0;¡5;25)g.
Finally, note that B(N;f0g;A;w) = (10;15;20).
7.4.2 Pmas on mountain situations
The scheme A0 = (w(i;bT(i)))T22Nnf;g;i2T is an example of a pmas. To ¯nd
other pmas-es it is interesting to note that if Ak is a pmas of the connection
game (N;ck), for each k 2 N, then
Pn
k=1 Ak is a pmas of (N;^ c). This motivates
us to concentrate on how to ¯nd a pmas of connection games.
If k = 2 T then (T;ck) is the zero game and hence core(T;ck) = f0g. If k 2 T
then it follows from Theorem 7.4.2.iii that
core(T;ck) = fx
®k




T = w(k;bT(k))ek + ®(w(k;bT(k)) ¡ w(k;sT(k)))(ebT(k) ¡ ek)
if bT(k) 6= 0, and x
®k
T = w(k;0)ek if bT(k) = 0. Note that the core has a
unique element if bT(k) = 0. The next Theorem 7.4.4 shows that each core
element x
®k
N of (N;ck) can be extended to a pmas, namely A®k. Here A®k =7.4. A CONNECTION SITUATION ON MOUNTAINS 115
(a
®k







0 if k = 2 T;
(x
®k
N )i2T if k 2 T and bN(k) 2 T;
x0
T if k 2 T and bN(k) = 2 T:
This cost allocation scheme corresponds to the situation where k 2 T pays his
connection cost w(k;bT(k)) and also as compensation for bN(k) of ®k times
the marginal contribution of bN(k) in T if bN(k) 2 T, and no compensation
if bN(k) = 2 T. Note that `column' k of A0 equals `column' k of the scheme
B(N;f0g;A;w). Note moreover, that in rows T with k = 2 T we have a core
element since 0 is the unique core element of < T;ck >, and in rows T with
k 2 T and bN(k) = 2 T we also have core elements. It follows from the following
lemma that also the rows with k 2 T and bN(k) 2 T contain core elements. So,
A®k is a stable monotonic allocation scheme.





N )i2T 2 core(T;ck).
Proof The only thing to show is that ¡®(w(k;bN(k)) ¡ w(k;sN(k))) 2 [0;
w(k;sT(k)) ¡ w(k;bT(k))]. Note that
0 · ¡®(w(k;bN(k)) ¡ w(k;sN(k)))
= ®(w(k;sN(k)) ¡ w(k;bN(k)))
· w(k;sN(k)) ¡ w(k;bN(k))
= w(k;sN(k)) ¡ w(k;bT(k))
· w(k;sT(k)) ¡ w(k;bT(k)):
At the last equality we used the fact that bN(k) = bT(k) and at the last inequal-
ity that
w(k;sN(k)) = minfw(k;i)ji 2 (N [ f0g)nfbN(k)g;(k;i) 2 Ag
· minfw(k;i)ji 2 (T [ f0g)nfbT(k)g;(k;i) 2 Ag
= w(k;sT(k)):
Theorem 7.4.4 For each ® 2 [0;1], A® = (a®
T;i)T22Nnf;g;i2T is a pmas of
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Proof By Lemma 7.4.3, we only have to prove that aS;i ¸ aT;i for all S;T 2 2N
and i 2 N with i 2 S ½ T. Take i 2 N, S;T 2 2N such that i 2 S ½ T. We
consider 3 cases:
(i) Suppose that i 2 Snfk;bN(k)g. Then a®
S;i = 0 ¸ 0 = a®
T;i since the column
(aU;i)U22Nnf;g;i2U is a zero column.
(ii) Suppose that i = bN(k) 2 S ½ T. Then a®
S;bN(k) = a®
T;bN(k) = ®(w(k;bN(k))¡
w(k;sN(k))) if k 2 S, and a®
S;bN(k) = a®
T;bN(k) = 0 if k = 2 T. If k = 2 S and k 2 T
then a®
S;bN(k) = 0 ¸ a®
T;bN(k) = ®(w(k;bN(k)) ¡ w(k;sN(k))).
(iii) Suppose that i = k 2 S ½ T. Then a®
S;k = a®
T;k = (x®
N)k if bN(k) 2 S,
and a®
S;k = w(k;bS(k)) ¸ w(k;bT(k)) = a®
T;k if bN(k) = 2 T. If bN(k) = 2 S
and bN(k) 2 T then a®




Theorem 7.4.5 Each core element x 2 P(N;c) can be extended to a pmas of
(N;c).
Proof Since P(N;c) =
Pn
k=1 core(N;ck) in view of Theorem 7.4.2 one can ¯nd






N 2 core(N;ck) for
every k 2 f1;:::;ng. Each x
k;®k
N has a pmas extension Ak;®k by Theorem 7.4.4.
Then A =
Pn
k=1 Ak;®k is a pmas of (N;c).
Example 7.4.3 Reconsider the situation of Example 7.4.1. Then (10;0;0) is
the unique core element of (N;c1), the core element (¡21
2;171
2;0) of (N;c2) is
the midpoint of the core of (N;c2), and (0;¡21
2;221
2) is the midpoint of the core
of (N;c3). So x = (71
2;15;221





P(N;c). Then A1; 1
2 + A2; 1
2 + A3; 1
2 is a pmas extending x. In matrix notation
A1; 1
2 + A2; 1
2 + A3; 1
2 =
1 2 3
N 10 0 0
(12) 10 0 ¤
(13) 10 ¤ 0
(23) ¤ 0 0
(1) 10 ¤ ¤
(2) ¤ 0 ¤
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a pmas extension of (71
2;15;221
2).
7.4.3 Bi-monotonic allocation schemes and cost monotonic-
ity
A connection game (N;ck) has the property that k is a veto player because
ck(S) = 0 for all S not containing k. For such games bi-monotonic allocation
schemes (bi-mas) are introduced in Branzei et al. (2001) (see also Voorneveld et
al. (2002)). A bi-mas for such a game with a veto player is a stable allocation
scheme with the property that the veto player is weakly better o® and the
other players weakly worse o® in larger coalitions. Let us be more speci¯c.
An allocation scheme (bT;i)T22Nnf0g;i2T is a bi-monotonic allocation scheme for
(N;ck) if
each row (bT;i)i2T 2 core(T;ck); (7.2)
and for all S;T 2 2N with k 2 S ½ T
bT;k · bS;k (7.3)
bT;i ¸ bS;i for all i 2 Snfkg: (7.4)
It turns out that for connection games bi-monotonic allocation schemes exist.
Moreover, each core element of (N;ck) can be extended to a bi-mas, as Theorem
7.4.6 shows. For ® 2 [0;1], let (b®





T if k 2 T;
0 if k = 2 T:
Theorem 7.4.6 For every ® 2 [0;1], (b®
T;i)T22Nnf0g;i2T is a bi-mas extending
x®
N.
Proof (i) In view of Theorem 7.4.2 row T in (b®
T;i)T22Nnf0g;i2T is a core element
for each T ½ N and row N equals x®
N. So, (7.2) holds.
(ii) To prove (7.3) note that for S ½ T and k 2 S we have
w(k;bS(k)) ¸ w(k;bT(k)); (7.5)118 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMES
w(k;sS(k)) ¸ w(k;sT(k)): (7.6)
Using (7.5) and (7.6) we obtain (7.3) as follows:
b®
T;k = (1 ¡ ®)w(k;bT(k)) + ®w(k;sT(k))
· (1 ¡ ®)w(k;bS(k)) + ®w(k;sS(k))
= b®
S;k:
(iii) To prove (7.4) for S;T with i;k 2 S ½ T, i 6= k, we consider 3 cases:
i 6= bS(k); i = bT(k); i = bS(k) 6= bT(k).
If i 6= bS(k), then i 6= bT(k); so, b®
S;i = b®
T;i = 0.
If i = bT(k), then i = bS(k) and then
b®
T;i = ®(w(k;i) ¡ w(k;sT(k)))
¸ ®(w(k;i) ¡ w(k;sS(k)))
= b®
S;i;
where the inequality follows from (7.6).
If i = bS(k) 6= bT(k), then b®
S;i = ®(w(k;bS(k)) ¡ w(k;sS(k))) · 0 = b®
T;i.
Example 7.4.4 Take the game of Example 7.4.2. Then for k = 3 the bi-mas,
corresponding to ® = 1









(23) ¤ ¡5 25
(1) 0 ¤ ¤
(2) ¤ 0 ¤
(3) ¤ ¤ 30
Now, suppose a mountain situation < N;f0g;A;w1 > changes to the mountain
situation < N;f0g;A;w2 >, where w2(i;j) = w1(i;j) for all (i;j) 2 Anf(k;l)g
and w2(k;l) > w1(k;l). Consider the allocations B1 = B(N;f0g;A;w1) and
B2 = B(N;f0g;A;w2). Then, obviously, B1
i = B2
i for all i 2 Nnfkg, and
B1
k = w(k;bN(k)) = B2
k if bN(k) 6= l, while B2
k > B1
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allocation rule B is cost monotonic on the class of mountain situations. Allo-
cation rules where compensations for connections play a role do not have this
cost monotonicity property. The reason is that if an arc increases so much in
costs that there is a change of best connection points, the new connection point
pro¯ts from the compensation and is better o®.
Example 7.4.5 Consider again the mountain situation of Example 7.4.1. Con-
sider the allocation B(N;f0g;A;w) and the allocation E(N;f0g;A;w), where
compensations of half of the marginal contribution take place. The alloca-
tion B(N;f0g; A;w) equals (10;15;20) and E(N;f0g;A;w) equals (71
2;15;221
2).
If we change the mountain situation such that the cost of (3;2) raises to 40
then we obtain as allocations B(N;f0g;A;w) and E(N;f0g;A;w), respectively,
(10;15;25) and (5;171
2;271
2). In the allocation E(N;f0g;A;w) player 1 is better
o® because of compensations from two players.120 CHAPTER 7. VARIANTS OF MCST GAMESBibliography
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In dit proefschrift staat de toepassing van coÄ operatieve speltheorie centraal bij
de analyse van kostentoewijzingsproblemen, die voortvloeien uit situaties waar
netwerken geconstrueerd moeten worden. Zo'n situatie doet zich voor wanneer
een aantal economische agenten rechtstreeks of indirect verbonden moet worden
met ¶ e¶ en of andere voorziening (de bron). Als verbindingskosten tussen agenten
hoog zijn dan zullen agenten de mogelijkheid van samenwerking onderzoeken om
de kosten te drukken. In feite zal een groep agenten, die besluit om samen te
werken, een netwerk vormen van minimale kosten. Zo'n netwerk wordt een min-
imum opspannende boom (mob) genoemd. Echter, indien zo'n mob gevonden is,
dan is dat nog geen garantie dat deze ook daadwerkelijk wordt geÄ ³mplementeerd:
de agenten moeten ook nog in staat zijn om de kosten van deze mob op ¶ e¶ en of
andere manier te verdelen en daartoe moet het bijbehorende kostentoewijzing-
sprobleem opgelost worden. Dit kostentoewijzingsprobleem is bestudeerd in
het fundamentele paper van Bird in 1976. Voor problemen waarbij een netwerk
geconstrueerd dient te worden heeft Bird een bijbehorend coÄ operatief spel gefor-
muleerd (een zogeheten mob spel), waarbij de spelers de economische agenten
zijn en waarbij de waarde van een coalitie gelijk is aan de minimale kosten van
een netwerk dat alle spelers in de coalitie rechtstreeks of indirect met de bron
verbindt.
In dit proefschrift worden een aantal kostentoewijzingsmechanismen voorgesteld.
Deze brengen de agenten fracties van de kosten van verbindingen in rekening, die
gevormd worden tijdens het toepassen van het algoritme voor het vinden van een
mob, dat geÄ ³ntroduceerd werd door Kruskal in 1956. Deze mechanismen worden
Construct and Charge regels genoemd. Zij kunnen makkelijk geÄ ³mplementeerd
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worden in praktische situaties, zijn °exibel voor veranderingen in de situatie,
en voldoen aan de voorwaarde van continue controle door de betrokken agen-
ten. Het blijkt dat een deel van deze mechanismen overeenkomt met de klasse
van Obligatie regels. Aangetoond wordt dat Obligatie regels monotoon in de
kosten zijn en een populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema induceren. Interes-
sante regels onder de Obligatie regels zijn de P-waarde en de P¿-waarden, voor
iedere volgorde ¿ van de spelers. Andere karakteristieken van Obligatie regels
zijn dat verschillende uitvoerbare volgordes van de verbindingen tot dezelfde
kostentoewijzingen leiden en dat al deze toewijzingen in de Bird core zitten.
Varianten van netwerkconstructieproblemen worden ook bekeken.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de benodigde voorkennis en notatie geÄ ³ntroduceerd.
The concepten `mob situatie' en `mob spel' worden geformuleerd en geÄ ³llustreerd
voor volledige grafen met een kostenstructuur. Deze voorbeelden zullen in het
gehele proefschrift gebruikt worden om andere concepten te illustreren. Basis-
begrippen uit de coÄ operatieve speltheorie, zoals `core' en `populatie monotoon
toewijzingsschema's' worden ook behandeld en toegelicht via voorbeelden.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het Subtraction Algoritme gepresenteerd. Dit algo-
ritme berekent voor iedere mob situatie en iedere volgorde van de spelers een
populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema. Als basis van dit algoritme dient een
decompositie-stelling, die toont hoe ieder mob spel geschreven kan worden als
een niet-negatieve combinatie van mob spelen behorende bij 0 ¡ 1 kostenfunc-
ties (dit worden simpele mob spelen genoemd). Het blijkt dat het Subtraction
Algoritme nauwe banden heeft met het fameuse algoritme van Kruskal voor het
vinden van een mob. Bovendien wordt voor iedere volgorde ¿ van de spelers
de P¿-waarde geÄ ³ntroduceerd als het toewijzingsmechanisme voor mob situaties
die de kosten van de grote coalitie verdeelt via het Subtraction Algoritme, met
¿ als initialisatie.
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt de collectie Construct and Charge (CC-) regels voor
mob situaties geÄ ³ntroduceerd. Deze regels worden gede¯nieerd aan de hand van
belastingsystemen, en speci¯ceren speciale toewijzingsmechanismen aan de hand
van het algoritme van Kruskal voor het vinden van een mob. Bovendien besteedt
dit hoofdstuk speciale aandacht aan Obligatie regels voor mob situaties. Ken-
merkend voor deze regels is dat zij voor iedere mob situatie een kostentoewijzingSAMENVATTING 131
opleveren, die gezien kan worden als het product van een dubbelstochastische
matrix met de kostenvector van verbindingen in een optimale boom, verkregen
via het algoritme van Kruskal. Aangetoond wordt dat speciale belastingsyste-
men, de zogeheten conservatieve systemen, tot een collectie van CC-regels leidt
dat samenvalt met de collectie Obligatie regels. Een interessante eigenschap van
deze regels is dat verschillende uitvoerbare volgordes van de verbindingen tot
dezelfde kostentoewijzingen leiden. Eigenschappen van speciale Obligatie regels,
zoals de Potters-regel (P-waarde) en de P¿-waardes, eerder geÄ ³ntroduceerd in
Hoofdstuk 3, worden ook besproken. Het blijkt dat de P-waarde samenvalt
met de Equal Remaining Obligations (ERO) regel, voorgesteld door Jos Potters
(hetgeen ook de naam van de regel verklaart). Bovendien blijkt dat de P-waarde
het gemiddelde is van de P¿-waarden.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt eerst aangetoond dat Obligatie regels monotoon in de
kosten zijn en bovendien leiden tot een populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema.
Daarna wordt een nieuwe manier voor het de¯niÄ eren van de irreducibele core
gepresenteerd, gebaseerd op een niet-Archimedische halfmetriek. De Bird core
blijkt interessante monotoniciteits- en additiviteitskenmerken te hebben en ieder
stabiel toewijzingsmechanisme dat monotoon in de kosten is, blijkt een selectie
van de Bird core op te leveren.
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt een axiomatische karakterisering van de P-waarde
gegeven, waarbij kegelwijze positieve lineariteit van de P-waarde een funda-
mentele eigenschap blijkt te zijn en waarbij ook de ontbinding van een mob situ-
atie in simpele mob situaties een rol speelt. Gebruik makend van de additiviteits-
eigenschap wordt ook een karakterisering van de Bird core gegeven. Een waarde-
theoretische interpretatie van Obligatie regels, waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt
van `sharing values' voor kostenspelen wordt ook bediscussieerd.
In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt aangetoond dat voor varianten van de klassieke mob
spelen een populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema niet noodzakelijkerwijs hoeft
te bestaan. In het bijzonder behandelt dit hoofdstuk monotone mob situaties
en gerichte mob situaties. Gerichte mob situaties van een speciale soort wor-
den bekeken, namelijk die situaties die te voorschijn komen wanneer het prob-
leem bekeken wordt voor het verbinden van eenheden (huizen) in de bergen
met een waterzuiveringsinstallatie. Voor dergelijke situaties wordt een simpele132 SAMENVATTING
methode beschreven om een populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema te bepalen.
Het blijkt dat de cores van gerelateerde kostentoewijzingsproblemen een sim-
pele structuur hebben en dat ieder core element uitgebreid kan worden tot een
populatie monotoon toewijzingsschema en ook tot een bi-monotoon toewijz-
ingsschema.